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Notes and Comments
Copyright and License Protection for
Computer Programs:
A Market Oriented Assessment
"Programs are a relatively new type of writing, and how copy-
right protects them is not universally understood."
- National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works'
I. Introduction
Copyright is the right of an author to retain certain control
over the reproduction of his intellectual creation.2 It is, in es-
sence, the grant of a monopoly for a limited period of time in
order to ensure that any economic benefits accrue to the author,
and thus encourage him to further creation. s
The concept of copyright is not new. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the Statute of Anne specifically recognized the exclusive
rights of authors to reproduce their works. 4 Following the Amer-
ican Revolution, all the former colonies, with the exception of
Delaware,5 passed laws extending to authors the "legal security
of the fruits of their study and industry."" The United States
1. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 20 (July 31, 1978).
2. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
3. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 503, 506-07
(1945). See generally N. BooRSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (1981) (commentary on the pur-
pose of copyright).
4. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
5. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 4 (3d ed.
1989).
6. Id. (quoting the preamble to the Mass. Act of March 17, 1783).
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recognized these rights in its Constitution.' Today, the statutes
granting copyright comprise an entire volume of the United
States Code.'
Recently, however, courts have faced a new challenge: ap-
plying copyright principles to computer programs.9 To the ex-
tent programs differ from literary or other works, courts have
been forced to reassess the application of previously established
judicial standards. 10
This reassessment period has been short. Programs have
been in the marketplace for less than forty years." The current
market structure for programs was formed less than twenty-
three years ago' 2 and their formal inclusion under a statutory
grant occurred only ten years ago.13 As a result, there has been
little time to establish a coherent body of judicial thought.
An analysis of the programming industry shows that the au-
thors - the program developers - do not rely solely on statu-
tory copyright protection. 4 For example, program developers
commonly use licenses to protect sensitive areas.' 5 This Com-
ment compares the extent to which programs are protected by
copyright, as delineated by recent court decisions, with the pro-
tection offered by licenses.
To provide a basis for understanding the unique protection
problems associated with programs, Part II of this Comment in-
cludes a definition of the term "program," a brief history of the
evolution of programs, and a discussion of the relevant charac-
teristics of both programs and the programming industry. Com-
monly used licensing provisions are also highlighted and
analyzed.
Part III of this Comment focuses on the statutes granting
copyright to authors, while Part IV reviews judicial interpreta-
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
9. Computer programs are hereinafter referred to as "programs." For a discussion of
the term "program," see infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 22.
12. See infra notes 23 & 131 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 23 & 131-39 and accompanying text.
14. Smiddy & Smiddy, Caught in the Act, DATAMATION, June 15, 1985, at 102 (a
discussion of the methods of protection used by program developers).
15. See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
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tion of these laws. Part V contrasts the scope of copyright pro-
tection, as established by statute and case law, with commonly
used license provisions. It argues that the protection granted
and the protection required are not the same. Focusing on con-
gressional intent, alternatives that would return to these princi-
ples are discussed. Part VI concludes that, if current judicial
trends continue, licenses will cease to be a viable means of pro-
tecting programs. This Comment proposes that market forces be
allowed to determine the extent of the protection extended to
computer programs.
II. Background
A. A Definition: Software or Computer Program
The first hurdle to be crossed in dealing with computer pro-
grams is the lack of a commonly accepted lexicon of terms. An
early decision clearly illustrates this confusion. In 1979, the Dis-
trict Court of West Virginia, lacking a more precise formulation,
defined the term "software" by a process of elimination. 6 Other
courts were more precise, defining software as "the logic and di-
rections loaded into the machine that cause it to do certain
things on command. 1 7 However, no single definition is consist-
ently employed by either courts or commentators.18 As a result,
the use of the term "software" creates problems in analysis.
From a legal standpoint, the term "computer program" is more
precise. A computer program is defined by federal statute as "a
set of statements to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result."' 9 This Comment will
16. State ex rel. E.D.S. Federal Corp. v. Ginsburg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 621 n.1 (W. Va.
1979) ("The software segment of the industry includes everything other than hardware
manufacture, and software is generally described as the program which instructs the
computer on its function.").
17. United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 154 n.3 (4th Cir. 1978) (use of telephone
tracers attached to a computer does not constitute invalid electronic surveillance), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
18. See, e.g., 1 M. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW SOFTWARE PROTECTION § 2.06 n.1 (1989)
(the term "software" includes programs, data bases, and documentation); M. GEMIGNANI,
COMPUTER LAW 16 (1985) ("software" includes programs, documentation of programs,
instruction manuals, operations, and the like). But see, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 587 n.7 (1978) ("software" refers to programs); Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell,
Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1979) ("software" is used to refer to programs).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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discuss copyright protection only as it relates to such
"programs."
B. The Development of the Programming Industry
In less than forty years, programs have grown in economic
importance from "give-aways" 20 to the source of almost twenty
billion dollars in yearly revenue."
1. Industry Beginnings
The first machine generally recognized as a computer was
developed in 1949.2 Within twenty-five years, computer manu-
facturing became a major industry.2
In the earliest stages of the computer industry's develop-
ment, computer manufacturers supplied specialized system pro-
grams to their customers.24 These programs generally were not
marketed as having their own intrinsic value but were provided
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-25.
21. In 1988, computer programs generated over eighteen billion dollars of revenue in
the United States. This figure is projected to increase to twenty-nine billion dollars by
1991, an industry growth of approximately 160% over a three year period. E. JuLIUSSEN
& K. JULIUSSEN, COMPUTER INDUsTRY ALMANAC 10.16 (1988) (quoting estimates from
Data Analysis Group). See also Davis, U.S. Giants Run a $50 Billion IS Tab, DATAMA-
TION, Nov. 15, 1989, at 42 (the top 120 U.S. companies estimate their spending on pro-
grams in 1989 to be almost eight billion dollars).
22. Although Blaise Pascal developed a numerical computing machine in 1642,
Binac (Binary Automatic Computer), which authorities cite as the first computer, was
developed by Eckert and Mauchly in 1949. See E. JULIUSSEN & K. JuLIUSSEN, supra note
21, at 11.1.
23. The number of operational computers increased from fewer than two dozen in
1952 to more than two hundred thousand in 1975. M. BENDER, supra note 18, at § 1.03,
1-6 & n.1 (citing Testimony and Background Material before the U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, International Data Corp.
(July, 1974)). By 1989, the estimated number of operational computers was close to five
million. E. JULIUSSEN & K. JULIUSSEN, supra note 21, at 10.4-9 (quoting an estimate from
International Data Corp.).
24. "System programs" or "operating systems" are those programs which instruct
the central processing unit of a computer - the part that does the calculations - on
how to use the resources available to it. Such resources include internal memory, auxil-
iary storage devices such as discs and tapes, and input/output devices such as printers
and terminals. System programs also supervise the execution of other programs. A.
CHANDOR, A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS 277 (1970). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (injunction restraining
Franklin from commercially marketing Franklin computers with Apple operating sys-
tems), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/4
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with computers as part of a package." Other specific application
programs 26 were written by the customer's own staff of program-
mers.17 The expense and time required to create application pro-
grams created a new marketing opportunity.2 At first, entrepre-
neurs responded by providing customized services to develop
individualized programs. By the early 1970s, a new industry had
developed to address the demands of common customer
requirements.29
2. The Bifurcation of the Computer Program Market
Programs, like other commercial goods, reflect the require-
ments of their market. In the initial stages of the market's devel-
opment, computers were purchased almost exclusively by busi-
nesses.8 0 The machines themselves were costly, large, and
generally required specialized environments."1 Trained data
processing professionals were required to operate them.32 Busi-
nesses which acquired computers created a new corporate infra-
structure, the data processing department, to realize a return on
their major, new investment.33
Programs in this environment were complex; they were
designed to solve business problems requiring massive calcula-
tions and large amounts of data.3 4 They were also expensive, due
to their high development costs" and the limited market over
25. M. GEMIGNANI, supra note 18, at 60. This practice was known as "bundling" and
was a general industry practice until 1970. See also Bender, Trade Secret Protection of
Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909, 912 n.9 (1970).
26. An application program solves a user's individual problem or addresses a partic-
ular need. For example, a program that performs inventory analysis or creates and prints
invoices would be referred to as an application program. A. CHANDOR, supra note 24, at
34; see also Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1243.
27. K. FISHMAN, THE COMPUTER ESTABLISHMENT 273 (1981).
28. Since the third party market had not yet developed and the computer manufac-
turers were not producing application programs, the customer was forced to develop his
own. See M. PHISTER, JR., DATA PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 9 (2d ed. 1979).
29. Id. at 26.
30. Id. at 8.
31. The larger computers require specialized rooms with raised floors and controlled
temperature and humidity. See, e.g., S. AUGARTEN, BIT By BIT 254 (1984).
32. Id.
33. W. FUORI & L. AUFIERO, COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 497 (2d ed.
1986).
34. Id. at 431.
35. See generally M. PHISTER, JR., supra note 28, at 210-21 (discussing the factors
1991]
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which to amortize these costs3 6 Specialized salesmen marketed
these programs directly to businesses.37 Detailed, signed con-
tracts were used to document the resulting agreements.3
The marketplace characteristics changed dramatically in the
late 1970s with the advent of the personal computer.39 The com-
puter moved from the data processing department to the desk,
where it was used to solve the daily analytic problems of the
individual worker.4 0 Designed for use in the home or office, the
machines required nothing beyond standard electric current.'1
The user of the personal computer operated it himself, usually
with no other instruction than that supplied by a user's manual.
Programs reflected their new environment. They became
simpler because they were designed to solve the problems of an
individual, rather than an entire business. 4 Since programs were
marketed to people who had neither training nor interest in data
processing, they were designed to be "user friendly.' 43 Programs
involved in program development and their related costs).
36. The International Data Corporation forecasts that 1,490 large-scale computers
will be shipped in 1990. The corresponding forecast for small-scale or personal com-
puters is 270,000. E. JULIUSSEN & K. JULIUSSEN, supra note 21, at 10.5, 10.7.
37. M. PHISTER, JR., supra note 28, at 222.
38. See, e.g., AMDAHL CORP., AMDAHL UTS SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT (Sept.
1986) [hereinafter AMDAHL LICENSE]; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., IBM
SYSTEMPLAN, AGREEMENT FOR IBM LICENSED PROGRAMS (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter IBM/
ALP LICENSE]; SUN SYSTEMS, PURCHASE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. SYSL2 - SUN OPERATING
SYSTEM LICENSE, TwO-USER RIGHT TO USE (Version A, Mar. 1987) [hereinafter SUN
LICENSE].
39. The first personal computer, the Kenbeck I, was built in 1971. Four years later,
MIT introduced a 256 byte Altair personal computer. In 1977, Apple introduced the first
personal computer to achieve widespread consumer use, the Apple II. In 1981, Commo-
dore introduced the VIC-20 home computer and IBM introduced its 5150 personal com-
puter. E. JULIUSSEN & K. JULIUSSEN, supra note 21, at 11.9.
40. M. EDELHART & D. GARR, THE COMPLETE COMPUTER COMPENDIUM 190 (1984).
41. For example, the IBM Personal Computer 5150 requires only standard house-
hold current.
42. Common uses for the personal computer are games, education, and business ap-
plications such as word processing, simple financial forecasts, and recordkeeping. M.
EDELHART & D. GARR, supra note 40, at 191.
43. The importance of ease of use in marketing programs written for the personal
computer is seen in the advertising emphasis upon this quality. E.g., Microsoft, INFORMA-
TION WEEK, Sept. 3, 1990, at 18-19 (the program "was designed to be easy to learn. And
use. Neophytes, not to mention troglodytes, will be up and running in no time.");
Quarterdeck, COMPUTER SYSTEM NEWS, July 30, 1990, at 72 ("Thank goodness compli-
cated programs like Windows and OS/2 aren't the only way to multitask and window on
the PC."); SPC Software Publishing, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 10, 1990, at 102 ("[I]t
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/4
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also became less expensive" because of decreased development
costs and an expanded market.45
As a result, the marketing of programs also radically
changed. In order to reach the large number of potential users
while keeping marketing costs minimal, new sales approaches
were developed. Retail stores marketed programs over the
counter to walk-in customers.40 Since signed agreements were
burdensome in this environment, 47 unsigned "shrink-wrap" li-
censes were used. 8
couldn't be any simpler.").
44. The charges for personal computer games and educational programs range from
$8 to $500. Charges for business programs range from $100 to $1,000. M. EDELHART & D.
GARR, supra note 40, at 76.
45. See supra notes 35-36.
46. Retail outlets at one time accounted for seventy percent of the personal com-
puter program market. R. FERTIG, THE SOFTWARE REVOLUTION: TRENDS, PLAYERS, MARKET
DYNAMICS IN PERSONAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE 65 (1985).
47. In the retail environment, verifying the identity of a customer, assuming the
customer was willing to sign a license, would presumably involve the same procedure
that retail businesses now use to verify a customer's identity before accepting a check.
Some retail stores require two separate pieces of identification which must be noted by
document number on the back of the check. Telephone interview with the manager of
Consumers, Port Chester, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 1990) (credit card and driver's license required
as proof of identification in order to accept a personal check as payment).
48. The term "shrink-wrapped" license is used by industry commentators to refer to
the license printed on the outside of the box containing the program. The license and
box are sealed in a clear plastic heat-sealed wrap (shrink wrap) which allows a prospec-
tive customer to read the license before acquiring the program. See, e.g., Brooks, Shrink-
Wrapped License Agreements: Do They Prevent the Existence of a "First Sale"? THE
COMPUTER LAWYER, Apr. 1984, at 17; Oppenheimer, Shrink-Wrapped Enforcement, PC
TECH JOURNAL, Sept. 1985, at 177.
Such licenses tend to be short. Their length is dictated by the space on the side of
the box and the minimum type size restrictions of the various states. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1989) (a minimum eight point type size is required for
contracts dealing with consumer goods).
The license agreement states that acceptance on the part of the licensee is accom-
plished by the act of breaking the wrapper enclosing the package. See, e.g.,
WORDPERFECT CORP., WORDPERFECT LICENSE AGREEMENT (1989) ("Read the following Li-
cense Agreement before opening this sealed package. If you do not agree to the terms
and conditions in the Agreement, promptly return this unopened package for a re-
fund."). Id.
The legal basis for such contracts is the Uniform Commercial Code which recognizes
acceptance by act. U.C.C. § 2-206. This in turn is based on a recognition that programs
are goods. Communications Groups v. Warner Communications, 138 Misc. 2d 80, 83, 527
N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (a program package is within the definition of
"goods" under the Uniform Commercial Code and so subject to implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness). See generally Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under
1991]
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C. Unique Characteristics of Programs
Programs have certain unique characteristics which exacer-
bate the common problems associated with protecting intellec-
tual property. In order to protect one's rights in intellectual
property, it is axiomatic that one must be able to identify when
one's works have been pirated.49 There are three factors which
make such identification difficult with regard to programs. First,
a program may be embodied in a number of forms."' As a result,
for a developer to identify a program as a pirated copy of his
work, he must be able to recognize it in any of its many forms.
Second, programs are written in specialized languages. To com-
pare two programs for similarities, even when in the same form,
requires special training.5 1 Finally, although a program creates
visible results, such as printed outputs or screen displays, these
results are not the program itself. 52 Two programs could create
identical visible results, such as invoices. One program may be
an exact copy of the other, or it may be a totally unique
work - neither conclusion can be presumptively inferred from
the invoices themselves.53
The difficulty of protecting programs is exacerbated by the
fact that the act of pirating is at the same time simple and lu-
the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979).
49. The term "piracy" is generally used in the programming industry to refer to
unauthorized copying or creation of derivative works. See, e.g., Newsworthy Items:
Software Piracy, 5 MICH. COMPUTER LAW., Fall 1989, at 6 (study on the international
dollar costs of program piracy); Morgan & Ruskell, Software Piracy - The Problem,
INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND DATA SYSTEMS, Mar./Apr. 1987, at 8 (discussion of the
methods used to prevent piracy).
50. A program can be expressed as specifications, algorithms, flowcharts, source
code, or object code. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1229-31
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
51. Program infringement cases usually require expert witness testimony. See, e.g.,
Manufacturer Technologies Inc. v. CAMS Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D. Conn. 1989)
(expert testimony as to effect of hardware on the method of screen navigation in a pro-
gram). See also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232 (in determining whether two programs
designed to operate a dental lab infringed, the Third Circuit concluded that "[t]he ordi-
nary observer test.., was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings, and.
. is of doubtful value in cases involving computer programs on account of the programs'
complexity .... ").
52. See, e.g., Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (output is not a copy of a program).
53. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244-45.
[Vol. 11:303
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crative. Programs have a very high market value per unit"4 and
are extremely easy to duplicate.58 This encourages not only ver-
batim copying but also adaptations. Once an adaptation is made,
multiple copies can be marketed at minimal production cost to
the adaptor.
Developers' problems in protecting their programs are also
heightened by a general public perception that it is not "wrong"
to copy programs." Because of the computer's design, a user
must copy the program from the medium on which it is distrib-
uted to the computer on which it is used.5 Further, standard
operational procedure dictates that backup copies be created to
protect against inadvertent destruction of the original.8 In every
day practice, the distinction between a permitted and a forbid-
den copy is one of form, not substance.5 9
D. Unique Characteristics of the Program Industry
In contrast to computer manufacturing, the program indus-
try has low capital barriers to market entry and a heavy content
of skilled intellectual labor.60 As a result, the industry has a
54. Charges for programs for large computers are often several thousand dollars.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss MACHINES CORP., IBM PROGRAMMING ANNOUNCEMENT -
290-016 (Jan. 23, 1990) (X.25 SNA Interconnection Version 2 Release 2: one time charge
of $15,120, plus a monthly license charge of $420); INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES
CORP., IBM PROGRAMMING ANNOUNCEMENT - 290-002 (Jan. 9, 1990) (Cooperative
Software Program-Integrated Retail Information System: one-time charge of $150,000).
Charges for programs for personal computers range from $10 to over $1,000. Brooks,
supra note 48, at 17-18.
55. The time required to copy WordPerfect using an IBM Personal Computer 5150
is under ten minutes. The procedure requires entering only three commands.
WORDPERFECT CORP., WORDPERFECT FOR IBM PERSONAL COMPUTERS 11 (1989) (proce-
dure to create backup copy of WordPerfect programs).
56. Buckler, Are You Breaking the Law?, COMPUTING CANADA, June 9, 1988, at 34
(people do not perceive copying and distributing software as stealing); Raysman &
Brown, Liability for Unauthorized Changes in Software, N.Y.L.J, Nov. 15, 1989, at 3
(licensees routinely take liberties with licensed software).
57. See, e.g., WORDPERFECT CORP., supra note 55, at 9 (installation instructions).
58. Id. at 11-12.
59. The problem is severe. It has been estimated that unauthorized copies represent
a loss to the program industry of several million dollars. Morrow, Copy Protection of
Software Programs, INSURANCE SALE s, Aug. 1989, at 27.
60. Clapes, Lynch, & Steinberg, Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the
Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1493,
1506 (1987).
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large number of participants."e Competitors in the industry have
two means to increase market share: price-performance e ' and in-
novative function."
As a competitive tool, price-performance is limited. If ob-
tained through mere price-cutting, it has a natural cut-off at the
point of zero profit.8 ' Innovative function has a strategic advan-
tage in that it is limited only by the developer's imagination. It
has a disadvantage in that the needed exclusivity may be diffi-
cult to ensure. Rather than developing programs with innovative
designs, less scrupulous firms may pirate the design of another
innovative product.6 5 This practice also has pricing advantages
because it substantially reduces development costs.
E. Alternative Means of Protection
Program piracy has become such a major problem that the
industry has been forced to focus on protecting its program as-
sets.6 Several methods are available to a developer for such pro-
tection: notably, patenting a program, 7 relying on trade secret
61. "Cottage industries," characterized by a low entry fee, high anticipated rate of
return, and a marketplace not dominated by a small number of monolithic competitors,
are the last bastions of the entrepreneur. It has been said that all a successful program-
ming firm needs is one bright programmer and a little money. For example, one well-
known firm, Advanced Computer Techniques, was started with only the know-how of its
founder, Charley Lecht, and an initial capital of $800. K. FISHMAN, supra note 27, at 274.
62. "Price-performance" is a measure of the program's capabilities (such as speed or
storage capacity) divided by price. Clapes, supra note 60, at 1507 n.43.
63. "Function" refers to the range of uses of a program. Id.
64. A business marketing its products at less than cost not only faces economic ruin,
it faces government action. Pricing below cost to effect a competitive advantage is pro-
hibited by the Robinson-Patman Act if such practice is intended to eliminate competi-
tion. Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, ch. 592 Stat. 1526 (1936)(codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982)); see also, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115, 120 (1954) (price cutting may violate the Robinson-Patman Act), reh'g
denied, 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
65. Clapes, supra note 60, at 1508.
66. It has been estimated that program piracy currently costs American firms about
two to three billion dollars a year. Lock Up Your Software, THE EcoNomisT, Jan. 14,
1989, at 77.
67. Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (1988), patentable subject, disclosure of opera-
tion, novelty, utility, and nonobviousness are required for a program to be patentable.
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 26 (1966) (a combination of old mechan-
ical elements acting as a shock absorber for a plow did not meet the test of nonobvious
nature).
Programs often fail to meet these basic requirements. For example, a program would
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/4
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protection, 5 or even using a technical solution to address the
fail the test of novelty if there was a prior program (or art structure or device) which did
substantially the same thing in substantially the same way. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 437 F.2d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1971) (test for novelty: patent for per-
cussion drilling bit invalid because it was anticipated by prior art), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
918 (1971). There is general agreement, however, that the test of nonobviousness is likely
to present a program with the most problems. M. GEMIGNANI, supra note 18, at § 42:3; M.
BENDER, supra note 18, § 3A.02, at 3A-6.1 (over 90% of all computer programs would fail
the nonobvious requirement).
Patents may be used to protect an idea, but not a law of nature or a pure algorithm
such as a mathematical formula. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
(rejecting an attempt to patent a method of converting binary coded decimal numbers
into pure binary numbers) with materials cited infra notes 102-04 and accompanying
text (copyright does not protect ideas). As a result, only programs whose claims are lim-
ited, and do not preempt all further uses of a formula, will be accepted.
Patent protection grants a seventeen year monopoly free from infringement from
both independent invention and "equivalents" (programs using substantially the same
means to achieve the same result in substantially the same way). Compare M.
GEMIGNANI, supra note 18, at §§ 42:2, 42:27A (1985 & Supp. Jan. "1989) with materials
cited at infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (copyright grants protection for the
author's lifetime plus fifty years, although truly independent creations will not infringe).
Patent protection from equivalents is not without limit. A recent case held that two
inventions which are sufficiently different taken as a whole might not infringe even if
individual features infringed upon each other. Texas Instruments Inc.. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (imported calculators had suf-
ficient technological changes to avoid infringement of a United States manufacturer's
patent), reh'g denied, 846 F.2d 1369 (1988). Applied to programs, where inventive piracy
has reached a fine art, this standard may cripple the actual protection a patent offers.
Patents are difficult to obtain. The initial requirement is that a written description
be created "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the [device] .... 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
Acquiring a patent also requires a patent search of prior art and an examination by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Compare M. GEMIGNANI, supra note 18, §
42:4 with infra note 112 (ease of acquiring copyright protection).
Another drawback, from the standpoint of a program, is the average two year wait to
obtain a patent. M. GEMIGNANI, supra note 18, at § 42:4 n.12. The useful marketing life
of a program from its development (as opposed to the length of time it may be used) is
only three years. Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
909, 916 (1970).
68. A trade secret is something not generally known which gives a competitive ad-
vantage. Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 377 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1967) (principles incor-
porated in a sandwich grill known to the industry and hence not a trade secret), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967).
Trade secret relies on state civil or common law and, in some states, trade secret
theft statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 165.07 (McKinney 1967).
Courts have held that computer programs can be included under trade secret protec-
tion. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928-
30 (10th Cir. 1975) (antitrust suit alleging unfair competition and misappropriation of
trade secrets), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act includes
programs in its definition of trade secret. UNIF. TRADE SEcRms AcT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 541
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problem. 9 The simplest and most prevalent technique7 0 - and
the focus of this Comment - is the use of a license based on
the rights granted under the copyright statutes. 1
F. Typical Licensing Provisions
An analysis of the licenses used by the programming indus-
try shows that there are several common provisions used to pro-
tect the developer's asset - the program.
One such provision is the retention of title to the copy of
the program by the developer/copyright owner. This is achieved
in two steps. First, the agreement is clearly characterized as a
(1980).
A trade secret is protected against unauthorized use or disclosure but not against
independent development. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 757, 758 (1939). Trade secret rights
arise when a confidential relationship is established, either by implication as in an em-
ployer/employee relationship, or by contract. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261,
278, 245 N.E.2d 263, 272 (1969) (to establish misappropriation of a trade secret, it must
be shown that the defendant was in a position of trust or confidence with the trade
secret holder).
While characterization as a trade secret protects even the idea, this protection is lost
if there is inadvertent disclosure, even if such disclosure results from the unlawful activi-
ties of a third party. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d
950, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (misappropriation of trade secret for underwater system for
storage of strategic materials), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). For programs which are
widely marketed the risk of such disclosure is significant. Required security increases the
cost of the program. In addition, for personal computer programs, obtaining the signed
nondisclosure agreements is just as difficult as obtaining a signed license.
69. For example, developers have encrypted programs. Morgan & Ruskell, supra
note 49, at 9.
Another commonly used technique is the addition of a function to the program to
protect the program from being copied. Schneider, Users Must Take Responsibility to
Control the Illegal Copying of Software, 9 INFOWORLD, Oct. 5, 1987, at 56. In addition to
the disadvantage of the cost incurred in creating the required program function, this
solution had major marketing disadvantages. Vociferous customer objections eventually
forced developers to abandon this solution. Id.
70. Brooks, supra note 48 at 19 (licenses, specifically shrink-wrapped licenses, used
by a majority of programs for the personal computer); Fuentebella, Testing Limits of
Software Copyright, BANK SYSTEMS & EQUIPMENT, Feb. 1989, at 42 (program developer
relies on licensing protection for want of technological protection).
71. A license is a document which gives the licensee permission to perform certain
acts or to exercise a certain privilege. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal. App. 2d 639,
643, 160 P.2d 37, 39-40 (1945) (California administrative rule requiring licensing for out-
of-state beer distributors). A license is neither property nor a property right. American
States Water Service of Cal. v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606, 612, 88 P.2d 770, 773
(1939) (a franchise tax on corporations and banks is a license). '
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license arrangement,"' not a sale." Second, title is explicitly re-
tained by the developer. 4 Accordingly, the customer is relegated
to the position of licensee. In other words he is a mere possessor,
not an owner.
Typically, licenses restrict access to programs in two ways.
The first restriction concerns access to the program itself. The
developer distributes his program in object code7 5 and prohibits
decompilation 6 of this code." Thus, the licensee is permitted
access only to the reports produced by the program, the displays
it creates on computer terminals, and the unintelligible object
code. A licensee cannot analyze the actual sequence and logic of
the program's instructions without decompiling the program. To
accomplish this would be a violation of his license agreement.
The second access restriction addresses who may access the pro-
72. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("[Amdahl] agrees to grant and
the customer agrees to accept a license .... "); APPLE CORP., APPLE LICENSE AGREEMENT 1
(Version 001-0100-A) [hereinafter APPLE LICENSE] ("[Apple software] is licensed, not
sold, to you .... "); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("This is a license agreement
and not an agreement for sale."); LoTus DEVELOPMENT CORP., LoTUS LICENSE AGREEMENT
(1983) [hereinafter LOTUS LICENSE] ("[Lotus] retains the ownership of this copy of
software which is licensed to you .. "); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("Sun hereby
grants to LICENSEE a perpetual, non-transferrable, non-exclusive, limited license ...
."1).
73. By definition, "sale" results in a transfer of title. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200
(5th ed. 1979).
74. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 3 ("Nothing in this Agreement shall
be interpreted as transferring any right to title to the intellectual property in the UTS
Software."); APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("You own the disk on which the Apple
Software is originally or subsequently recorded or fixed, but Apple retains ownership of
all copies of the Apple Software itself."); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("IBM
retains title to the copy of the Program and any copy made from it."); LOTUS LICENSE,
supra note 72 ("[Lotus] retains the ownership of this copy of software which is licensed
to you .... "); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("Title to all copies of the Licensed
Software remains in Sun or in third parties from whom Sun has acquired license
rights.").
75. "Object code" or "object language" refers to programs translated into a machine
language which is directly understandable by the computer. A. CHANDOR, supra note 24,
at 273.
76. The term "decompilation," or alternatively "disassembly," refers to the process
by which machine-intelligible object code is converted back to human-intelligible source
code. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1962 (West 1987).
77. See, e.g., IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("You will not reverse assemble
or reverse compile Programs."); LOTUS LICENSE, supra note 72 ("You MAY NOT ...
alter, modify or adapt the software.., including, but not limited to, translating, decom-
piling, disassembling, or creating derivative works."); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2
("LICENSEE shall not disassemble or decompile the Licensed Software.").
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gram. Generally, developers prohibit licensees from making the
program available to any third party."
Another prevalent license provision restricts the actual type
of computer on which the program may be used. Programs li-
censed for use on large computers may often be operated only on
a specific machine.70 Programs for personal computers are less
limited; they may be used on any personal computer, but on
only one such machine at a time.80
Licensees may be limited in the activities they can perform.
Copying the program is allowed only under restricted circum-
stances.8" The right to create a derivative work is similarly re-
strained or, at times, totally prohibited."2
A protective measure worth noting, although not as com-
monly used as those mentioned previously, is an explicit refer-
78. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("You may not distribute copies of
the Apple Software to others or electronically transfer the Apple Software from one com-
puter to another over a network."); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 3 ("You may
not distribute any Program to any other persons, including other licensees, without
IBM's written consent."); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2 ("Licensee shall not make
such proprietary software available for use by any third party unless such third party
holds an appropriate license to utilize the License Software in conjunction with such
proprietary software.").
79. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2 (nontransferable program may be
used only on a "Designated Machine" and only for the customer's own internal business
purposes); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 (restricts transfer of the licensed pro-
gram by authorizing use only on the customer's "Designated Machine"); SUN LICENSE,
supra note 38, at 1 (license grants the "limited license to use the Licensed Software in
machine-readable form on the Designated Equipment at the Designated Site.").
80. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("This license allows you to ...
[u]se the Apple Software only on a single Apple computer."); INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORP., IBM PROGRAM LICENSE AGREEMENT (1990) [hereinafter IBM/PLA LI-
CENSE] ("[Y]ou may ... use the Program on only one machine at any one time .... ").
81. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2 ("Amdahl grants to Customer the
right to reproduce the UTS Software in only those full or partial copies which are neces-
sary to support the Use licensed under [this agreement] .... "); HEWLEr PACKARD, HP
125/250/300/1000/3000/9800 SOFTWARE TERMS 1 (Revision No. R8-81 1985) ("[Programs]
may not be copied except for archive purposes, to replace a defective copy, or for pro-
gram error verification .... "); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 ("Each license
granted authorizes you to... copy [a program] in support of your authorized use .... ").
82. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("YOU MAY NOT MODIFY,
ADAPT . . . OR CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED UPON THE APPLE
SOFTWARE."); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 (modification and/or inclusion
into another program is permitted, however the result may not be distributed to third
parties).
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ence to the proprietary nature of the program itself.8 This en-
ables the developer to argue that he has maintained his
common-law rights under trade secret.' Yet another category of
protective provisions applies generally to the license itself: its
transfer and acceptance.
Transfer provisions found in licenses for business-oriented
programs prohibit the licensee from transferring the programs to
any other party.88 Thus, the developer has control of his pro-
gram to the extent that he knows the identity of those parties
whom he has licensed. Licenses designed for programs used on
personal computers, however, allow transfer only if the trans-
feree accepts the license. 6
Perhaps the most crucial provision of all, since it governs
whether the other provisions of the license are actually in effect,
is the means by which the license is accepted. In the direct sale
environment of programs for large computers, the traditional
means of acceptance of a contract - signature - is used. 7
However, retail marketing of personal computer software
presented unique problems.88 As a result, the shrink-wrap li-
censes generally depend on acceptance by act. e
83. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("Apple Software contains trade
secrets . ); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2 ("Sun hereby states that the Licensed
Software constitutes a valuable asset and is to be considered Proprietary Information.").
In some cases, provisions stating that the program constitutes a trade secret are used.
84. See supra note 68.
85. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 2 (non-transferable program); IBM/
ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 4 ("Any attempt to sublicense, assign or transfer any of
the rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement is void."); SUN LICENSE, supra note
38, at 1 (the program "may not be sold, leased, assigned, sublicensed or otherwise trans-
ferred, in whole or in part .... ").
86. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 (transfer of program only if "the
other party reads and agrees to accept the terms and conditions of this Agreement.");
IBM/PLA LICENSE, supra note 80, at 2 (allows transfer of the program only if a copy of
the license is transferred with the program and the transferee agrees to the license).
87. See, e.g., AMDAHL LICENSE, supra note 38, at 9 (space provided for the parties'
signatures); IBM/ALP LICENSE, supra note 38, at 1 (space provided for parties' signa-
tures); SUN LICENSE, supra note 38, at 7 (space provided for parties' signatures).
88. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., APPLE LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("BY OPENING THE PACKAGE,
YOU ARE AGREEING TO BECOME BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS AGREE-
MENT . . ... "); IBM/PLA LICENSE, supra note 80, at 2 ("IF YOU OPEN THE
READFIRST ENVELOPE, YOU AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS..
. ."); LoTus LICENSE, supra note 72, at 1 ("BY OPENING THIS PACKAGE YOU AC-
CEPT THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.").
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III. Copyright Protection for Programs - The Statutes
A. Copyright - Generally
1. Scope of Copyright
Congress has the power under the Constitution to "secur[e]
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 0 The purpose be-
hind this limited monopoly privilege is to benefit society because
"[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of [the author's]
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas."9'
Federal law9 2 grants the owner of a copyright the exclusive
right to: 1) reproduce the copyrighted work, 2) prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work, and 3) sell, lease,
rent, or otherwise distribute copies of the copyrighted work.9 s
This right is regarded as a property right,9 4 although it attaches
to an intellectual work, rather than the tangible medium in
which the work is embodied.9 5 In effect, the owner of the copy-
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558"(1985) (maga-
zine's use of 300 to 400 words from an unpublished memoir exceeded fair use); see also
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (the "encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
. . . .1).
92. By statutory fiat, the federal law of copyright preempts applicable state laws. 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988) states that:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of a copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any state.
Id.; see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana
License Act preempted by Federal Copyright Law).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (1988). This section also provides the owner with other
rights pertinent only to literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, motion pictures, graphic or sculptural works, and other audiovisual works.
17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1988).
94. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) (perfo-
rated sheets used with player pianos are not copyrightable).
95. The distinction is between the story, the intellectual work, and the paper on
which it is recorded; between the program, the intellectual work, and the reel of com-
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right96 has the ability to prevent the possessor of the tangible
medium from taking certain actions.9 7
However, the rights protected by copyright are not all-en-
compassing. Copyright protects against copying, but not against
independent production. 8 Copyright protects the expression or
form of an idea - not the idea itself.9 As a result, copyright
protection does not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work[s." '100 Similarly, copyright
does not extend to discrete facts or systems explained within a
puter tape or computer diskette on which it is recorded.
96. The statute grants rights to the "owner of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
Typically, an author of the work owns the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). However,
there are two specific exceptions to this rule. An author may transfer his rights, in which
case the transferee is the owner. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988). Alternatively, in the case of
"works made for hire," the person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
owner of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
By definition, a "work for hire" is a work performed either by an employee within
the scope of his duties or as a result of a specific order. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). With
regard to the first category, the term "employee" is construed in the light of the general
common law of agency. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
740 (1989) (whether the organization which conceived the idea for a sculpture or the
artist who executed it was the owner of the copyright). To fall into the second category, a
commissioned work, the work must be identified as such by a written agreement and
must also belong to one of several statutorily-defined categories. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
It is unclear whether programs fit under any of these categories. Beck, Half a Loaf:
Supreme Court Work for Hire Decision Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, CoM-
PUTER LAWYER, July 1989, at 37, 39-40.
97. Specifically, those which the statute grants the author as his exclusively. See
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
98. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 30.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea . . . ."). This is often referred to as the "idea/
expression" dichotomy. For example, the idea of a boy and girl from two feuding groups
falling in love cannot be protected but the "West Side Story" libretto can. See, e.g.,
O'Neill v. Dell Publishing, 630 F.2d 685, 686 (1st Cir. 1980) (no infringement was found
where the only concept incorporated from an unpublished manuscript was the idea of a
World War II submarine surfacing thirty years later: "Copyright protection extends only
to the expression of the idea; it does not protect the idea itself."); Decorative Aides Corp.
v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (diagram and in-
structions printed on a drapery header were merely similar expressions of the same idea
incorporated in an instruction sheet for a similar device), aff'd, 657 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1981).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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work.101
The federal statutes provide certain limitations on the over-
all rights granted to the copyright author. Under section 107 of
the 1988 Copyright Act, the otherwise exclusive rights of the
copyright owner are limited by "fair use." ' Factors used in de-
termining the fairness of use reflect underlying equity considera-
tions.108 Thus, the relevant considerations include: the purpose
and character of the use, the commercial or nonprofit nature of
the work, the nature of the original work, the amount of the
original work used, and the effect of the use on the work's poten-
tial market.10' Other statutes, specific to the type of work con-
cerned, provide additional limitations of the basic guarantees.108
To be eligible for fifty years of copyright protection,10s a
work must be an "original work[] of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression .... , To qualify as original re-
quires independent creation without copying.10 8 In addition,
works published before March 1, 1989, must include a copyright
101. See, e.g., Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright protects a book on the
subject of bookkeeping, but does not protect the system of bookkeeping explained
therein).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
103. R. NiMmsjx. THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1.11[3], at 1-67 (1985).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
105. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1988) (limiting a copyright owner's exclusive rights by
permitting reproduction by libraries and archives); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1988) (permitting
certain performances and displays). See also infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
106. Copyright protection for works created after 1977 extends for the author's life-
time plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). For a work for hire, the term of protec-
tion is seventy-five years from the first year of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
Such protection is more than adequate for programs since they have an estimated mar-
ketable life of three years. Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 909, 915 (1970).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
108. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970)
(infringement of the art and text of greeting cards: "originality necessary to support a
copyright merely calls for independent creation, not novelty .... ") The requirement for
originality may be met by a slight degree of originality. Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 825 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982) (sufficient originality for
copyrightability existed in soft-sculpture dolls which differed from other, similar dolls in
facial expression, shape of nose, hands, buttocks, eyes, elbows and ears). However, more
than a trivial variation of another work is required. L.. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 491 (2nd Cir.) (copyright denied for plastic "Uncle Sam" banks which dis-
played only trivial variations from an antique cast iron bank), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976).
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notice. 109 Since the adoption of the Berne Convention by the
United States,1 ° notice of copyright in this country is permis-
sive, not mandatory."' However, registration remains a prereq-
uisite to a suit for infringement of works originating in the
United States.11
2
109. For works published between January 1, 1978 and March 1, 1989, a copyright
notice consisting of a copyright word or symbol, the name of the copyright owner and the
year of first publication was required. However, omission of the notice was not fatal.
Under 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1988), a forgetful author could salvage his copyright by register-
ing a copyright claim within five years after first publication and making reasonable ef-
forts to add a notice to subsequently distributed copies.
But see NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
(Intel's copyright on microcode forfeited because it failed to make a reasonable effort to
add the notice to those copies distributed after Intel discovered the omission of the copy-
right notice).
For works published prior to January 1, 1978, the 1909 Copyright Act was less for-
giving. Works without notices went into the public domain. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320,
§§ 10, 19, 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078-80 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19, 20 re-
printed in 17 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 10, 19, 20 (West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed
1976).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (the term "Berne Convention" is used to refer to the
Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland
on September 9, 1986). The Convention, as currently amended, grants copyright protec-
tion in all member countries to any work first published in one of those member coun-
tries. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 8.
The United States ratified the Berne Convention in October of 1988. Congress
amended Title 17 to implement the Berne Convention's provisions. Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
111. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7,
102 Stat. 2853, 2858 (replacing the prior language that notice "shall be placed on all"
with the permissive "may be placed on").
112. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). Registration is also required to obtain damages. 17
U.S.C. § 412 (1988). Registration of a copyrighted work is relatively simple. For computer
programs, registration is achieved by sending a completed form, ten dollars, and one
copy of "identifying material" to the copyright office. "Identifying material" consists of a
"visually perceptible without the aid of a machine or device, either on paper or in
microform" copy of the first twenty-five and last twenty-five pages of the program.
Source code is preferred. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT RE-
GISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS CIRCULAR R61 (July 1983).
Despite the relatively simple requirements of registration the programming industry
has required even more speed and flexibility. See, e.g., M. BENDER, supra note 18, at §
4.03 (quoting ADAPSO proposal for modifications to section 117, item 4, 559 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) A-11 (Dec. 17, 1981)).
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2. Exclusive Right to Copy and Create Derivative Works
Current copyright law grants to the owner of the copyright
the right to exclude others from producing copies.113 This pro-
tection extends not only to verbatim copying but also to para-
phrasing. 1" To invoke protection against an unauthorized copy,
ownership of the original as well as infringement of that original
by copying must be proved. 118 A registration certificate is prima
facie evidence of ownership." 6 A presumption of copying will be
established by proof that the alleged infringer had access to the
copyrighted work and that the two works are substantially
similar."17
Current law also gives the copyright owner the exclusive
right to "prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
113. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) ("the owner of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive right[] to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ....").
The statute defines "copies" as material objects "in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
The section further explains that a work is "fixed" when the embodiment is "suffi-
ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration." Id.
114. See, e.g., Contemporary Arts, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 93 F. Supp. 739, 743
(D. Mass. 1950) (a ceramic dog need not be an exact or "Chinese copy" to infringe a
copyrighted sculpture), affd, 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), afl'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
115. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 10.10.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988) (a certificate of registration either before or within five
years of first publication of the work is prima facie evidence of the "facts stated in certif-
icate," namely the owner of the copyright, that the work in issue was original and copy-
rightable, and that the statutory formalities were complied with).
117. Benson v. Coca Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974-75 (11th Cir. 1986) (proof of access
and substantial similarity permits an inference of infringement).
Access is established by proof that the alleged infringer had a reasonable opportu-
nity to see or hear the copyrighted work. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1970) (infringement of greeting cards determined,
in part, by the defendant's access to cards, its practice of looking at other manufacturers'
cards, and its producing similar cards).
The exact line at which copying becomes substantial is not clear. See, e.g., Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (in a case of al-
leged infringement between cloth designs, the court admitted that the tests for determin-
ing substantial similarity are, of necessity, vague). One standard used to establish sub-
stantial similarity is whether an ordinary observer would recognize the copy as having
been made from the copyrighted work. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry v. Honora
Jewelry, 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1974) (the "average layman would indeed detect numer-
ous differences" between the designs for two pins in the shape of turtles).
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work . . . ."" By statutory definition, a derivative work is one
"based upon one or more pre-existing works [in any] ... form in
which the work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."" 9 This
definition includes any revision, annotation, elaboration or other
modification which "as a whole, represent[s] an original work of
authorship .... 12 Unauthorized derivative works infringe on
the copyright. 12 1
While the principles regulating derivative works are clear in
the abstract, significant problems can arise in their application.
For example, a claim of infringement may be countered by the
argument that the derivative work contains so many modifica-
tions that it constitutes an independent work.122 Since modifica-
tions may be made simply to disguise piracy of the original
work, determining whether a work is derivative or original can
be extremely difficult. 123
118. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
120. Id.
121. A derivative work which makes a nontrivial contribution to an existing work
may be copyrighted by the derivative author. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630
F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (plastic wind-up toys based on Disney characters did not
provide sufficient additional contribution to avoid infringement). However, copyright in
a derivative work "extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work .... " 17 U.S.C. §
103(b) (1988); see also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1982) (sketch infringed copyrighted Paddington Bear). In this case, the court noted
that derivative works may infringe the original copyright if the derivative work were to
be published without permission from the owner of the original work. Id. at 34.
122. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyrighted play
based on interfaith marriage was not infringed by a work with a similar theme), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Judge Learned Hand commented on the thin line between
using an idea and infringement of the copyrighted work as follows:
[Copyright] cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations .... Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more
of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer pro-
tected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.
Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
123. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg, 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.) (rede-
signing a room divider by adding additional straight lines to filigree pattern did not save
redesigned work from infringement), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
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B. Copyright Protection for Computer Programs
1. Pre-1980 Statutory Protection for Programs
The earliest statutory copyright protection for programs can
be found in the Copyright Act of 1976.124 Although this Act did
not explicitly recognize programs as copyrightable, the accompa-
nying House Report clearly expressed a congressional intent to
include programs under the copyright umbrella.12
The 1976 Act's silence on the computer program issue 26
was attributable to a concern on the part of Congress that it did
not have sufficient information to take informed action.1 27 In
1974, when it became apparent that the pending revisions did
not address the problems created by computer technology, 28
Congress created the National Commission on New Technologi-
cal Uses of Copyrighted Work (CONTU). 29 CONTU's mandate
124. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988). The predecessor act was the Copyright Act of 1909.
A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 8. At the time of its enactment,
neither computers nor programs had been invented. See supra note 22 and accompany-
ing text. The Copyright Office first began to accept computer programs under the cate-
gory of literary works in 1964. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 3, at § 2:3 n.29.
125. The 1976 Copyright Act left it to the House Report to explain that programs
were included in the definition of literary works by stating that: "[The term 'Literary
works'] also includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that
they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distin-
guished from the ideas themselves."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5659, 5667 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 94-1476].
.126. The original version of section 117, included in the Copyright Act of 1976, dealt
with computer uses of copyrighted works. This version left open the copyrightability of
programs, themselves. In its original form, section 117 provided, among other things,
that the Copyright Act of 1976:
does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic [information
storage and retrieval systems], or in conjunction with any similar device, machine,
or process, than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17, or the
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977 ....
Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 117, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (previously codified at
17 U.S.C. § 117, repealed 1980). This provides less guidance in reality than appears on its
face. As of December 31, 1977, there were neither state nor federal laws relating to this
subject. The common law had only two decades in which to develop. N. BOORSTYN, supra
note 3, § 2:21, at 69.
127. H.R. REP. 94-1476, supra note 125, at 116 (the problems related to computer
programs were "not sufficiently developed for a definitive legislative solution").
128. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 1 (July 31, 1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
129. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
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was to develop a national policy that balanced the need for pub-
lic access to programs, the rights of the owners of copyrights in
these works, and the concerns of the consumer.18 0 It was not un-
til 1980, when Congress enacted CONTU's recommendations
into law, that computer programs were formally brought under
copyright protection."'1
2. Copyright Protection for Programs - 1980 Modifications
Congress' 1980 attempt to formally grant copyright protec-
tion to programs took the form of two modifications to the ex-
isting statutes. First, Title 17 of the United States Code was
modified to include a definition of a computer program.132 It
should be noted that the portion of Title 17 which defines the
works which are subject to copyright was never similarly
amended.133 Thus, applying copyright to programs requires ref-
erence to earlier legislative history which indicates a congres-
sional intent to include computer programs under copyrighted
works.1 3 4
The second, and more substantive, change to the existing
copyright law was the addition of a section concerned solely with
the extent of the rights granted to a copyright owner. Since pro-
grams were now considered to be copyrighted works,38 section
106 granted the program owner the exclusive right to copy and
create derivative works based on his own work." 6 Section 117
was enacted to limit these rights.13 7 Specifically, it created the
following exceptions:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an in-
fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program provided:
(1) that such new a [sic] copy or adaptation is created as an es-
130. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 1.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
135. By inference from 17 U.S.C. § 101 coupled with the legislative history. See
supra notes 125 & 132-34 and accompanying text.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
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sential step in the utilization of the computer program in con-
junction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner,
or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only
and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that con-
tinued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of
this section may be leased, sold or otherwise transferred, along
with the copy from which such copies are prepared, only as part
of the lease, sale or other transfer of all rights in the program.
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the au-
thorization of the copyright owner.1 3
8
3. Interpreting the 1980 Modifications
a. Legislative History
It is clear that Congress intended to grant some limited
right of protection to an "owner" of a copy of a program.139 Un-
fortunately, a plain language interpretation to determine the in-
tent of the statute is difficult because several critical terms are
undefined."1 0 It is also unfortunate that the minimal legislative
history associated with the 1980 amendments to Title 17 lend no
further clarification.1 4
1
138. Id.
139. As opposed to the "rightful possessor" which was in the originally proposed
version of the statute. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 12.
140. The terms "owner," "utilization," "essential step" and "adaptation" used in §
117 are not defined.
Because of the lack of legislative guidance, the following definition of "owner" will
be used for the purposes of this Comment: "The person in whom is vested the owner-
ship, dominion, or title of property; proprietor. He who has dominion of a thing, real or
personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has the right to enjoy and do with as he
pleases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARv 996 (5th ed. 1979).
In contrast, that same source defines "possessor" as one who has "detention and
control, or the manual or ideal custody, of anything which may be the subject of prop-
erty, for one's use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified right
in it." Id. at 1047-48.
Since Congress specifically chose the word "owner" rather than "possessor," it may
be inferred that they were not referring to someone with a qualified right.
141. The House contented itself with commenting that § 117 "embodies the recom-
mendation of the Commission of New Technological Works with respect to clarifying the
law of copyright of computer software." H.R. REP. No. 1307 (Part I), 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6460, 6482. Any analysis of the
[Vol. 11:303
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b. The CONTU Report
The final report produced by CONTU"42 is the primary ref-
erence used by courts in interpreting the congressional intent
behind its 1980 enactments. 48 The courts' reliance on this re-
port is well founded since Congress adopted CONTU's statutory
proposal with only one change. Although CONTU's recommen-
dation authorized any rightful possessor to make, or authorize
the making of, a copy or adaptation of a computer program, 44
Congress limited this right to owners.1
45
The analysis employed in the CONTU Report was based on
already existing copyright principles.'14  As the Report noted,
however, programs did not fit easily within this framework. 47
Copyright ordinarily forbids copying of a protected work. A
computer program, by its nature, must be copied from its me-
dium into a computer in order to operate. Thus, CONTU had to
draw a line between permissive and forbidden copying. It re-
solved the problem by permitting only copying which was "an
essential step" in "utilizing" a program.141
A similar problem arose in the area of derivative works.
comments to the Copyright Act of 1976 would be suspect since the House had made it
clear that it felt the subject was not sufficiently understood. H.R. REP. 94-1476, supra
note 125, at 117.
142. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128.
143. This view can be found in a number of court decisions. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1241-42 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1984); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49-51 (1990).
144. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 12.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (reproduced at notes 138, 140 and accompanying text).
146. For example, CONTU states that the policy underlying their efforts was to pro-
vide protection for authors without inhibiting the rightful use, further development or
dissemination of ideas. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 12. This policy was to be
carried out by protecting the expression of the program. Id. at 19 (quoting S. REP. No.
473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1975) and H.R. REP. 94-1476, supra note 125, at 57, that it
is "the expression adopted by the programmer [which] is the copyrightable element in a
computer program").
In addition, the CONTU relied on the most recent expression of these principles,
the Copyright Act of 1976 and its associated legislative comments, to provide a frame-
work on which to build. For example, the report uses the definition of copyrightable
material from that Act. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 18.
147. CONTU REP oRT, supra note 128, at 12-13.
148. Id. at 12.
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CONTU discussed requirements for certain types of program
adaptations. These are enumerated in the CONTU Report as:
1) an adaptation of the program to enable it to operate in
the possessor's computer; 1 9
2) the conversion of a program from one high-level language
to another; 150 and
3) the right to add features to the program that were not
present at the time of acquisition. 151
However, not all adaptations were permissible. 152 Adapta-
tions could be created only "so long as they did not harm the
interests of the copyright proprietor."' 53 Further, the right of ad-
aptation could be conveyed only by the express authorization of
the owner of the copyright." Finally, the adaptor could not
commercially market the adapted program.1"
Although CONTU recommended legislative action, it also
saw self-help as a viable alternative. " According to CONTU,
"[s]hould proprietors feel strongly that they do not want rightful
possessors of copies of their programs to prepare such adapta-
tions, they could, of course, make such desires a contractual
matter. 1
57
149. CONTU later expanded on the type of adaptations to which they were
referring:
Because of a lack of complete standardization among programming languages and
hardware in the computer industry, one who rightfully acquires a copy of a pro-
gram frequently cannot use it without adapting it to that limited extent which will
allow its use in the possessor's computer.... Thus a right to make those changes
necessary to enable the use for which [the program] was both sold and purchased
should be provided.
Id. at 13.
This language suggests that CONTU saw adaptations limited to an initial modifica-
tion or tailoring of a program.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Overall, CONTU saw adaptation as a personal exercise in "extensive marginal
note-taking." It did not perceive any economic impact to program developers. Id.
153. Id.
154. CONTU REPoRT, supra note 128, at 13.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. at 13-14.
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c. Limits to the Applicability of the 1980 Modifica-
tions: The Effect of a Rapidly Evolving Market
In the case of a rapidly changing industry, the time required
to formulate and pass a statute may result in a law that reflects
past, not current, industry requirements. When this occurs the
law may lag behind the industry it is designed to regulate. Con-
gress' 1980 enactments demonstrate this phenomenon.
CONTU's analysis was performed between 1974 and 1978.188
The personal computer did not come into common use until
1977.159 It did not become a major factor in the market until the
beginning of the 1980s.160 CONTU's analysis reflected the re-
quirements of the industry which existed at the time. It did not
reflect the requirements of an environment characterized by
mass marketing and "shrink-wrap" licenses.
IV. Copyright Protection for Programs - Judicial
Interpretation
A. Section 106 Issues
Although there were innumerable cases interpreting section
106 in a literary or artistic context, cases concerning copyright
protection for programs presented the federal courts with a
number of new challenges in interpreting the statute.16' The is-
sues were often inextricably interwoven with the technology of
computer programs. 162 The facts were presented in technical
jargon that was difficult to comprehend and often inconsis-
tent."" The kaleidoscopic changes that had beset the industry
158. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
159. M. EDELHART & D. GAR, supra note 40, at 57. See also supra note 39.
160. Home Computers, BusizN'ss WEEK, Sept. 10, 1990, at 64-65, (by the 1980s con-
sumers were purchasing hundreds of thousands of personal computers).
161. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in cases in which claims arise under
the federal copyright act. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
162. See, e.g., Hubco Data Prod. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983) (modification of programs which limited the func-
tion of the computer on which they ran).
163. Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(breach of contract action concerning a computer lease). The court expressed its frustra-
tion as follows:
By comparison, the misnomers and industrial shorthand of the computer world
make the most esoteric legal writing seem as clear and lucid as the Ten Con-
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resulted in a mismatch between reality and the environment en-
visioned by the statute.1 64 The inventiveness of program devel-
opers resulted in the courts facing a continuing series of de novo
situations. 165 In addition, since programs themselves had a rela-
tively short history,"' there were few decisions directly on-point
for guidance.
1. Does Media Matter?
Initially, the medium on which the program was embodied
presented significant problems to the courts in determining
whether a program was copyrightable. Traditionally, copyright
was construed to encompass only works that could be perceived
by humans. 1 7 Based on this rationale, a federal district court in
Illinois held that a chess-playing program distributed on a
ROM " chip was "mechanical." '69 As a non-written work, the
program was not under copyright protection. 170 In direct con-
trast, a federal district court in California held that a copy of a
program on a ROM chip was a true copy.1 71 Distinguishing the
chip as the tangible medium of expression, the court found that
mandments or the Gettysburg Address; and to add to this Babel, the experts in
the computer field, while using exactly the same words, uniformly disagree as to
precisely what they mean.
Id. at 408.
164. For example, the shrink-wrapped license had not come into general use. See
supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., infra notes 244 & 249 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
167. R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY T 1.03[5][b], at 1-26 (1985);
see also White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907) (a piano roll
was not copyrightable since it was not in a form visually perceptible to humans).
168. Read Only Memory. A ROM is an "internal permanent memory device consist-
ing of a semi-conductor 'chip' which is incorporated into the circuitry of the computer
.... Information stored on a ROM can only be read, not erased or rewritten." Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
169. Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), disagreed with by multiple cases as stated in Brown v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 767 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (7th Cir. 1985) (the Illinois district
court held that a ROM copy was not a copy under copyright law, hence, reproduction of
a computer chess playing program copied on ROM could not be an infringement), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986).
170. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
171. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (Radio Shack "input-output" program imprinted on a ROM is copyrightable).
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the program embodied on the chip was protectable. 111
An early interpretation of the 1980 amendments to the 1976
Copyright Act resolved the controversy in favor of programs,
providing protection for works in tangible media from which
they "can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' 1 73 In
subsequent decisions, the Third and the Seventh Circuits held
that the medium on which a program is stored is not relevant to
a determination of whether the program is protected.1 7" A fed-
eral district court of California, in a decision subsequently af-
firmed by the Ninth Circuit, went so far as to assert that "[it is]
crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all computer pro-
grams, fixed in any method and performing any function, be in-
cluded within copyright protection.'
7 5
2. Idea and Expression: How Much Can Be Protected?
CONTU suggested that the general principle of copy-
right - that expression is protected, ideas are not - should
also hold true for programs.17 6 While the principle seems clear,
its application to a program by drawing a "bright line" between
an idea and an expression has presented considerable difficulty.
Initially, the courts focused their analysis on whether the
172. The court also noted that the 1976 version of section 117 dealt with the use of
copyrighted works in conjunction with computers and the problem of "copying" the pro-
gram into a computer or subsidiary storage device so that it could be used. Noting that
the duplication of a chip is not the use of a copyrighted program in conjunction with a
computer, the court held that the disputed action was simply unprotected copying of the
chip. Id. at 173.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
174. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1982) (the
broad language used by Congress indicated that Congress intended expansive interpreta-
tions of the terms "fixation" and "copy" to encompass any technological advances in-
cluding programs embodied on ROMs); Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
999, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (a "copy" may be made in any medium whatsoever), afl'd,
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); see also Midway Mfg. V.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (computer programs in object code form
stored in ROM chips are copyrightable).
175. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (copying of Apple Program on ROM for commercial use infringed Apple's copy-
right), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
176. CONTU stated that "[o]ne is always free to make the machine do the same
thing it would if it had the copyrighted [program] placed in it, but only if by one's
creative effort rather than by piracy." CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 13.
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work in question was an idea or an expression. For example, a
federal district court in Texas held that the idea and its expres-
sion embodied in the input formats for a program were insepara-
ble. 71 Thus, under the principles of copyright, 7 s such formats
were not afforded copyright protection.
7 9
Programs themselves fared somewhat better. In two cases
involving verbatim copying of a microcomputer operating sys-
tem, the courts rejected arguments that operating system pro-
grams were per se mergers of ideas and expressions and hence
not protectable. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Interna-
tional, Inc., s° the Ninth Circuit found irrelevant the distinction
that programs were intended to control computer operations and
not to produce a discernable expression.' 8 ' Under this court's
analysis, the program "when written embodies expression.'
8 2
The idea (or process) merges with the expression only if no al-
ternative method of expression exists. 8 '
Using the same rationale, the Third Circuit, in Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,'8' proposed the follow-
ing test: If "other programs can be written or created which per-
form the same function as [the program in question], then that
program is an expression of the idea and hence
177. Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
178. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
179. In Synercom, the defendant created a program which was competitive to that
of the plaintiff but used data recorded in the format the plaintiff had developed. This
simplified a user's conversion from the plaintiff's to the defendant's program, making the
latter more marketable. The defendant did not copy the formats or forms in the tradi-
tional sense, nor did it furnish the plaintiff's format forms to its licensee.
Under the court's formulation, the issue was whether the sequence and ordering of
data, the input format, was the expression of an idea or the idea itself. By concluding the
input format was an idea, the court was forced to find that the format was not protect-
able under the basic principles of copyright. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1006, 1014-15.
180. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (injunction restraining Formula from duplicating
Apple operating system programs in a computer kit commercially marketed by Formula).
181. Id. at 523-24.
182. Id. at 525.
183. Id. The court noted that "Apple introduced evidence that numerous methods
exist for writing the programs" and accordingly concluded the Apple program was pro-
tectable. Id.
184. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (injunction restraining Franklin from commer-
cially marketing Apple operating systems with Franklin computers), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984).
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copyrightable."185
Arguments that an object code is a process or system (that
is, an idea, and hence not protectable) have also fared poorly.
Courts have consistently found programs copyrightable in either
source or object formulations. 18
Once these preliminary cases established a framework for
analysis, the courts began to focus on the specific aspect of a
program that constitutes the protected expression: the output,
the instructions, the functions, or the organization and
structure. 87
In SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems,' a
federal district court in Tennessee established that the instruc-
tions were copyrighted to the extent that a verbatim translation
of a program is copying, and hence an infringement of the origi-
nal program. 89
A more difficult issue is presented by programs written us-
ing the original program's flow chart or general definition.'90
Faced with this issue, the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory"' applied copyright protection
broadly, holding that "copyright protection of computer pro-
grams may extend beyond the program's literal code to their
185. Id. at 1253.
186. Hubco Data Prod. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
450, 453 (D. Idaho. 1983) (court refuses to accept defendant's argument that object code
is a machine process which is not communicated to others); Midway Mfg. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (computer programs in object code stored in ROM
chips are copyrightable); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d
Cir. 1982) (both humanly intelligible source code and machine-intelligible object code are
protectable).
187. R. NimMER, supra note 167, V 1.03[51[c], at S1-10 (Supp. 1989).
188. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (a copy of a statistics program with only
cosmetic changes found infringing).
189. Id. at 828-30; see also Williams v. Arndt, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 615 (D. Mass.
1985) (the translation of a manual into source code language is infringing because the
manual and the program produced substantially similar results).
190. In dicta, the SAS court considered the question of where copying stops and a
new work begins. It suggested that formulating a program based on a detailed descrip-
tion in a flow chart or prose instructions would probably infringe. In contrast, prepara-
tion from a general description of the problem to be solved by the program would not
constitute a copy or version of the original. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 830.
191. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (a program written in a different language and not
a direct translation of the original was found infringing on the basis of an overall sub-
stantial similarity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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structure, sequence, and organization .... Basing its con-
clusions on an analogy to literary works, which may be infringed
"even absent copying of the literal elements of the program,"
the court sought to draw the line between idea and expression
by reference to the purpose of the work.193 The court suggested
that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, while everything that is not necessary to that pur-
pose or function would be part of the expression of the idea. ' "
From this, the court concluded that, "[w]here there are various
means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular
means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is
expression, not idea. 19 5 The natural inference that resulted was
that the structure and logic of the program are protectable.9 6
Accordingly, the nonliteral translation of a program, which has
substantial similarity to the original program, may be an
infringment.197
The Whelan protection of structure and sequence has been
met with mixed acceptance from courts in other circuits. In Dy-
namic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning and Control, Inc., a federal
district court in New York followed Whelan's lead, extending
protection to a program structure.19s In contrast, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Plains Cotton Cooperative Association v. Goodpasture
192. Id. at 1248.
193. Id. at 1234.
194. Id. at 1236.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1237. The court also noted that, since structure and logic are among the
more costly aspects of program development, its rule was in concert with the basic ra-
tionale of copyright: to provide the proper incentive by protecting the developer's most
valuable efforts. Id.
197. To show infringement, a plaintiff must establish 1) that it owned the original
copyright, and 2) that the defendant copied the plaintiff's program. Id. at 1231. Copying
is established by showing access and substantial similarity. Id. at 1232. Hence, lack of
access would constitute an affirmative defense.
In Whelan, the suit concerned a program which had been developed in another com-
puter language, but which performed the same function as the infringed program. Id. at
1225-27. The developer of the infringing program had cooperated in writing the infringed
program. His first hand knowledge of the structure and form of the infringed program
satisfied the access requirement. Id. at 1232.
198. 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1334-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (a program created in a different
language which allegedly did not translate the original program's source code was found
infringing).
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/4
1991] PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Computer Service,199 refused to extend protection to the se-
quence and organization in computer programs under certain
conditions. As articulated by this court, if the external factors
"play a significant role in determining the sequence and organi-
zation" of the program, the program is not protectable 0 0 Courts
following the Plains Cotton test have refused to extend protec-
tion to programs where similarities in function were found to be
dictated by their underlying idea201 or to constraints inherent in
computer use.0
In cases where the more limited question of infringement of
screen displays are at issue, the Whelan holding has been fol-
lowed by some courts and limited by others. In Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,20 3 a district court in Cali-
fornia extended the reach of Whelan to include the protection of
the screen output.204 Noting that other programs existed that
199. 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (similarities in the programs dictated by the
"externalities of the cotton market" did not support charges of infringement), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987). The court's holding depended on interpreting Synercom to
stand for the proposition that organization and configuration of information fed into
computers were ideas not expressions. Id.
A criticism of Plains Cotton is that it failed to distinguish that the subject of the
Synercom holding was input formats, not true computer programs. See supra note 179.
200. Id. at 1262. This so called "merger doctrine" was developed first in non-com-
puter related cases. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879) (the book-
keeping system explained in a copyrighted book was not copyrighted); Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (similar set of rules for a sales pro-
motional sweepstakes did not infringe). The First Circuit explained its underlying
rationale:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic neces-
sarily requires," . . . if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyright-
ing a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the
substance.
Id. at 678; see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971) (infringement of jewelry design).
201. Data East USA v. Epyz, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 207-09 (9th Cir. 1988) (similarities
in video games were found because. both portrayed a karate contest).
202. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1995
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (the need to access existing files, edit the work, and print the work is
fundamental to a host of programs and so is unprotectable).
203. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
204. The subject of the suit was a menu-driven program which assisted users in
creating customized greeting cards, signs and other graphics. The court distinguished the
"idea" of a program for assisting the creation of greeting cards from the expression in
the program. Critical evidence introduced by the plaintiff was a third program, created
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performed the same function as the programs at issue, the Cali-
fornia court concluded that there existed expressions in the
screen output separable from the idea of the original program.20 5
Conversely, the district court in Connecticut, in Manufacturers
Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,206 refused to extend protec-
tion to screen display formats and conventions which were
adopted "from a very narrow range of possibilities. "27
3. Establishing Infringement
As in copyright cases for the more traditional types of
works,208 to establish a claim of infringement of a program, the
plaintiff must prove copying by showing that (1) the defendant
had access to a copyrighted program20 9 and (2) a substantial
similarity exists between the plaintiff's and defendant's pro-
gram.21 0 Generally, since programs tend to be complex, courts
follow a two-part test for similarity.21' First, a court uses expert
testimony to determine whether there is sufficient similarity be-
tween the non-protected aspects of the two works to establish
212copying. If so, the fact finder must then determine, "[f]rom
by another party, which performed the same function but had totally different structure
and audiovisuals. The court concluded that the overall structure, sequencing and ar-
rangement of screens was protectable by copyright. Id. at 1132.
Video game screens produced by programs had been established as copyrightable as
audiovisual works in other decisions. See M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th
Cir. 1986) (copyright infringement of both the program and audiovisuals of a video poker
game); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (copyright
infringement of both the program and audiovisuals of a video action game).
205. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
206. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989) (copyright infringement of screen displays of
a program which estimated the cost of machining a manufactured part).
207. Id. at 995.
208. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984,
1000-02 (D. Conn. 1989) (in considering copyright infringement of both a program and
screen output, the court considered access to the screen displays and reproductions of
them and to the source code of the original program).
210. Id. For use of this analysis in a case dealing with copyright protection for pro-
grams, see GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
211. This test was established in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir.
1946) (alleged infringement of musical composition).
212. Id. at 468-69, 473; see also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51-52
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (discussing continuing validity of the Arn-
stein test).
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the perspective of a reasonable lay observer," ' s whether there
are substantial similarities with the protected aspects of the
original work which would indicate "illicit copying" by the alleg-
edly infringing work.2 1'
Establishing infringement of a program is complicated be-
cause more than one program can produce virtually identical
screen output.21 5 Indeed the Whelan court noted that similari-
ties between screen displays are not direct evidence of infringe-
ment of the underlying program.2 16 Nevertheless, the Whelan
court noted that such similarities do have some probative value
because they are "caused" by the program.2 7 Other courts re-
quired more exacting standards of proof. For example, a district
court in Georgia not only held that resemblances between screen
displays were insufficient to establish infringement but required,
as a prima facie case, evidence of copying source and object
codes, as well as structure, sequence, and organization of the
program.21
More recently, developers are trying to force courts into a
different conceptual framework. By claiming copyright infringe-
ments on the screen design itself, developers are arguing that
the display is a separate entity rather than merely the output of
a program.21 Under this type of analysis, activities that con-
sisted of a pirating of screen output, without access to the source
or object code of the program, would constitute infringement.2 20
213. Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F. Supp. at 1001 (court applies the Arnstein
test); see also Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3rd Cir.
1986) (court applies the Arnstein test), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
214. See Walker, 784 F.2d at 51-52.
215. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244-45; Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F.
Supp. at 991.
216. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244 (3rd Cir. 1986).
217. "Insofar as everything that a computer does, including its screen outputs, is
related to the program that operates it, there is necessarily a causal relationship between
the program and the screen outputs ... and therefore they have some probative value."
Id.
218. Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455-56
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (use of an identical screen display by a "clone" program that was other-
wise independently created did not constitute infringement).
219. See, e.g., Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F. Supp. at 993 (court treats pro-
gram and its screen displays as two interrelated but distinct entities to the extent that
each contains copyrightable subject matter).
220. Id. at 1002.
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At least one court has accepted this rationale. In Lotus Develop-
ment Corp. v. Paperback Software International,2 1 infringe-
ment of both the menu command structure and the presentation
of these commands on the screen was established on the grounds
that Paperback had copied substantial copyrightable elements
from Lotus' copyrighted work.222
B. Section 117 Issues
1. Ownership
Section 117 reserves to an owner the right to copy programs.
The language of the statute limits the extent of the grant in two
ways. First, by specifying "owner," the statute excludes lessees
or others in lawful possession from those who may copy without
violating the copyright owner's rights.2 3 Second, under section
117, the right to copy is limited to that which is necessary "as an
essential step" in using the program.22
Courts have construed both limitations strictly. In GCA
Corp. v. Chance,226 a federal district court in California dis-
missed a claim by ex-GCA employees that their use of GCA's
copyrighted program in their own maintenance business was
permitted under section 117.26 As the court noted, the employ-
ees were not rightful owners of the program and their use of the
program was not intended by section 117.227 In Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,2  the court established that,
although a party could be a rightful owner, making copies for
non-essential purposes, such as marketing the program to
221. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
222. Id. at 70.
223. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (reproduced at notes 138, 140 and accompanying text);
see also notes 138 & 140 for a discussion of the term "owner."
224. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1988) (reproduced at notes 138, 140 and accompanying
text).
225. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
226. The suit concerned the use of GCA diagnostics and operating systems by for-
mer employees of GCA in the derivative business they had created repairing the GCA
machines. The employees admitted copying but claimed that § 117 gave them statutory
license to copy GCA's diagnostic and operating system programs. Id. at 719-20.
227. The court found that GCA employees were "not rightful owners within the
meaning of § 117, nor are the copies they make and make use of for the purposes in-
tended by § 117." Id. at 720.
228. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
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others, was not permitted.22 9 In Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype
Corp.,230 the federal district court in Massachusetts further lim-
ited the rights of owners; owners could not authorize other par-
ties to make their copies for them.23 1
2. Using Licenses to Establish Ownership
The three early cases discussed in the preceding section,
Formula, Micro-Sparc, and GCA, used the principle of owner-
ship to determine the rights of the parties. However, they did
not elaborate the criteria used to determine who the "owner"
was.23 2 Within the last two years, courts have begun to more rig-
orously analyze the question of ownership as determined by the
terms of the underlying license. In so doing, some courts have
challenged current marketplace licensing practices.2
The Fifth Circuit, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,234
considered the issue of ownership in the context of a program
provided under an unsigned, shrink-wrap license under which
the developer retained ownership of the copy.2" The court nulli-
fied the entire license on the theory that it was a contract of
229. Formula sold silicon chips containing copies of Apple's copyrighted programs.
Purchasers were instructed to insert the silicon chips into computers manufactured by
Formula. The copied programs then resided permanently on the computer. Id. at 522-23.
Although Formula claimed rightful ownership of diskettes containing Apple's programs,
the court held that Formula was not an owner-user under the usage of § 117. Id. at 524-
25. Since the copying done by Formula was not "essential" but merely convenient, the §
117 exception did not apply. Id. at 525.
230. 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984).
231. Amtype offered machine-readable versions of programs published by Micro-
Sparc in its magazine Nibble. The court determined that the Nibble readers were the
owners of the published programs. As such, the readers had the right to convert the
published programs into machine-readable form. They did not, however, have the right
to authorize Amtype to do the same. The court found that, while the "essential step in
utilization" language in 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) permits making an "input copy" from a disk
copy, it does not permit the creation of multiple copies for distribution. Id. at 34-35.
232. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
233. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
234. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
235. The fact that the license was a "shrink-wrap" license is not obvious from the
Fifth Circuit opinion. However, the district court of Louisiana in its earlier opinion ex-
plicitly referred to PROLOK as being "printed on each package." Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 753 (E.D. La. 1987). It is clear, however, that under the
license, Vault retained both title and ownership. The actual Vault license read, in part,
"[t]itle to the Licensed Software and all copyrights and proprietary rights in the Li-
censed Software shall remain with VAULT." Vault, 847 F.2d at 257 n.2.
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adhesion. 36 Because the license retaining title was void, the pos-
sessor of the copy was also an owner who could exercise those
rights provided in section 117.237
Using a similar license-based ownership analysis, the Ninth
Circuit reached an opposite result. In S.O.S., Inc. v. PAYDAY,
Inc.,5 6 the developer, S.O.S., retained ownership of the copy of
the program provided to PAYDAY under the terms of a signed
license.23 9 The court, by its interpretation, extended S.O.S.'s
ownership to any copies made from the original.24 0 Thus, under
section 117, it had the sole right to authorize copies or derivative
works.241 Accordingly, PAYDAY, as mere possessor, was not pro-
tected by the section 117 exceptions and "exceeded the scope of
its license when it copied and prepared a modified version of the
program without S.O.S.'s permission. "242
236. The Fifth Circuit was following the district court's holding on this point. The
district court found the PROLOK license a contract of adhesion because it was "drafted
unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it basis' to
the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms." Vault, 655 F.
Supp. at 760.
The license also provided that the applicable laws under which it was to be con-
strued were those of Louisiana. Vault, 847 F.2d at 257 n.3. The Louisiana License Act
included as an enforceable term of a software contract a prohibition of modifying and/or
adapting the program in any way, including adaptation by reverse engineering, decompi-
lation or disassembly. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964 (West 1987). The Fifth Circuit con-
ceded that the License Act should have answered any questions about the legality of the
Vault license provisions. However, the court held that the provisions of the License Act
which permitted a program developer to protect his program from decompilation or dis-
assembly conflicted with the right under § 117(1) to make an "essential step" adaptation.
Thus, in the court's view, the License Act "touches upon an area" of federal copyright
law and so was preempted by the federal copyright statutes. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
237. That is, the right to make copies or adaptations. 17 U.S.C. § 117 is reproduced
at text accompanying note 138.
238. 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
239. The fact that the license was signed may be inferred from the discussion of the
contractual agreement between S.O.S. and PAYDAY for the hardware. Id. at 1083.
240. Id. at 1088. Noting that, under federal copyright policy, licenses are assumed to
prohibit any use not authorized, the Ninth Circuit held that a licensee infringed the
owner's copyright if its use exceeded the scope of its license. Id. at 1090. This is contrary
to the general rule that contractual ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter. Ap-
plication of this rule in situations such as these should result in the presumption that the
drafter grants to the signee any right which it does not expressly retain. See, e.g., World
Wide Tracers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Protection Inc., 384 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Minn. 1986) (in
interpreting an ambiguous term in a security agreement, the court held "[w]here there is
an ambiguity in the contract, the contract will be construed against the drafter.").
241. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (reproduced at note 138 and accompanying text).
242. S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1089.
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C. Derivative Works: The Interplay of Sections 106 and 117
1. Modifications for Commercial Use
The GCA court dealt harshly with an entrepreneur who cre-
ated a business opportunity for himself based on a verbatim
copy of another program.2 43 Initially, courts seemed no less pro-
tective of the original program developer in cases in which the
entrepreneur was more creative.
In an analysis grounded in the language of the Copyright
Act, the Seventh Circuit held that a licensee of a video game
that used a circuit board to speed up the play created a deriva-
tive work.2 " Lacking the copyright owner's authorization, this
derivative work was a direct infringement on the copyright.24 5
Critical to the court's decision that the result was a derivative
work was an analysis of the economic loss accruing to the copy-
right owner.2 46 In the absence of express contract provisions, the
copyright holder was entitled to monopolize the preparation of
derivative works even for personal use by authorized licensees.2 4 7
A federal district court in Illinois arrived at a similar con-
clusion but focused more intensely on section 117 considera-
tions. In Midway Manufacturing v. Strohon,24 8 a "modification
kit" that complicated and accelerated the original, copyrighted
PAC-MAN game program was found infringing.24 9 The court
243. GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See supra
notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
244. Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.) (sale of circuit boards
that speeded up the rate of play in copyrighted video games infringed on the copyright),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
245. Id. at 1013-14.
246. Id. at 1014.
247. Id.
248. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
249. The original PAC-MAN program was relatively simple and the "pattern" of
moves readily easy to ascertain. Players, once they had determined the pattern, either
continued playing for extended periods on one quarter or lost interest because it was no
longer challenging. Strohon, identifying a rather large potential market (by 1982, over
96,000 of the $2500 game units had been sold), sold CUT-SEE modification kits to the
owners of the machines. By complicating and speeding up the play, the game units again
became profitable to their owners. Id. at 743.
Although the modification did not infringe the audiovisual aspects of the game, the
enhancement itself was only a slight adaptation of the original copyrighted computer
program. The PAC-MAN program was contained in four ROMs which contained over
16,000 bytes, some of which did not contain program instructions. The CUT-SEE pro-
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noted that section 117 permitted owners to adapt their programs
for use "in conjunction with a machine," but refused to accept
this as authority for sale of the modified PAC-MAN.25 Owner-
ship was crucial; mere possessors were not authorized under the
statute to make adaptations. 51 Using the same rationale, the
S.O.S. court enjoined PAYDAY from using a modified, pirated
copy of an S.O.S. program to provide payroll services to firms in
the entertainment industry.5 2
The district court of Idaho resorted to both sections 106 and
117 in its analysis in Hubco Data Products v. Management As-
sistance, Inc.25' Hubco offered Management Assistance (MAI)
licensees a modification of the program which replaced certain
"governors" in the program.2 4 This made the modified program
the equivalent of a much higher priced MAI program.2 55 Grant-
ing a request for an injunction, the court held that MAI had a
reasonable probability of successfully establishing infringe-
ment.25 6 Modifications of a licensee's MAI program by Hubco
employees involved unlawful copying of the MAI program.5 1
Modifications the licensees performed on their own licensed cop-
ies, using a Hubco program which copied a portion of the higher
gram reproduced approximately 97% of the PAC-MAN instructions in identical loca-
tions on the CUT-SEE ROMs and then added additional instructions at some of the
empty locations. Id. at 752-53.
250. Id. at 745 n.2.
251. Quoting from § 117, the court reminded Strohon that "[a]daptations ... may
be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner." Id. at 745 n.2. The
court also emphasized that adaptations were permitted only because they were required
to enable the programs to operate. Id.
252. S.O.S., Inc. v. PAYDAY, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1989).
253. 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983) (preliminary injunction to restrain
Hubco from offering an upgrade procedure for MAI's operating system).
254. Hubco's business opportunity was created by MAI's pricing strategy. MAI de-
veloped and sold both high-level and low-level operating systems for their computers, at
different prices. The low-level system was, in fact, the high-level system with certain
software blocks or "governors" which limited the processing capability of the machine.
By decoding the high and low-level operating systems and comparing them, Hubco was
able to pinpoint the "governors" that blocked certain operations. Id. at 451-52.
Initially, Hubco sent its employees to make the program modifications at MAI-own-
ers' sites on their copies of the program. Subsequently, Hubco developed a computer
program, which allowed the computer owners to perform the modification themselves.
Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 455-56.
257. Id.
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priced program into the licensee's copy, did not fall under the
section 117 exemption since Hubco was not the owner of the
higher priced program.2
The Fifth Circuit, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.," e
based its analysis primarily on section 117.260 Quaid's program,
RAMKEY, circumvented Vault's program, PROLOK, which was
designed to protect other programs from unauthorized copy-
ing.26 1 Having rejected the Vault license, which established
Quaid's ownership by default, 262  the Vault court held that
Quaid's copying of PROLOK into computer memory did not in-
fringe on Vault's exclusive rights to reproduce copies under sec-
tion 106.263 Declining to follow earlier, more restrictive interpre-
tations of section 117, the court found that Quaid's copying of
PROLOK for "the express purpose of devising a means of de-
feating its protective function" qualified as an "essential step"
activity permitted by section 117.264 Under the Vault standard,
258. Id.
259. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
260. Id. at 260-61.
261. Vault produced computer diskettes under the registered trademark PROLOK.
Each diskette was protected from copying by a physical fingerprint, a small mark physi-
cally placed on the surface of each diskette which contains unique, unalterable informa-
tion, and a PROLOK program. Program developers would copy their programs on the
PROLOK diskette and then market it. When a licensee of the application program tried
to load the program into its personal computer, PROLOK prevented the computer from
operating unless the original PROLOK diskette, with its unique fingerprint, was in the
computer's disk drive. Id. at 256-58. Essentially, PROLOK is an asset protection device
for program developers. A licensee who obtains an application program on a PROLOK
diskette is prevented from making multiple copies of that application and then distribut-
ing unauthorized copies to others.
Quaid's RAMKEY could circumvent the PROLOK protection. RAMKEY was dis-
tributed on a "CopyWrite" diskette. Any user could copy an application program resid-
ing on a PROLOK diskette onto a CopyWrite diskette. The copy of the program on the
CopyWrite diskette, since it was no longer protected by PROLOK, could then be run
without the original PROLOK diskette in the personal computer. The user could now
freely copy and distribute the application program, using the CopyWrite diskette. Id. at
257-58.
Two versions of RAMKEY were at issue. The 1984 version of RAMKEY contained
about 30 characters of PROLOK. The 1987 version of RAMKEY did not contain any
PROLOK code. Id.
262. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
263. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
264. Id. Section 117(1), reproduced at text accompanying note 138, permits copying
of that program provided the copy "is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
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the test of "essential step in utilization" was not the program's
intended purpose, but rather that of the copier.1
5
The Vault court also declined to find that RAMKEY was
an adaptation of PROLOK. 6 6 The court distinguished its deci-
sion from earlier cases on the grounds that RAMKEY provided
a function opposite to that of PROLOK and thus did not form a
substantially similar copy of Vault's program.6e
manner." Vault argued that the phrase "no other manner" should be interpreted as per-
mitting only copying of the program for its intended purpose. On the grounds that §
117(1) did not expressly require a copy to be made only for the use intended by the
copyright owner and in the absence of clear congressional guidance to the contrary, the
court refused to limit § 117. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
Vault's license read in part, "[y]ou may not transfer, sublicense, rent, lease, convey,
copy, modify, translate, convert to another programming language, decompile or disas-
semble the Licensed Software for any purpose without VAULT's prior written consent."
Id. at 257 n.2 (emphasis added). Since the court had found the PROLOK license void, it
was not required to consider whether Quaid had breached this contract by its copying
and subsequent analysis of PROLOK.
265. Id. at 261. This standard is questionable. Logically, a party copying a program
had some purpose in mind, which, under the Vault standard, seems to be a sufficient
justification for the activity.
266. Id. at 262-68.
267. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Whelan as dealing with programs which per-
formed the same function as the copyrighted work. Vault, 847 F.2d at 267-68. Whelan
held that a "court must make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about the charac-
ter of the work as a whole and the importance of the substantially similar portions of the
work." Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3rd Cir. 1986).
Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 1983) had empha-
sized that it is not the absolute amount of program instructions copied but the qualita-
tive importance of those characters. The Vault court argued that Midway held that "the
sale of a product which speeded-up plaintiff's programs constituted contributory in-
fringement because the speeded-up programs were derivative works." The Midway court,
or so the Vault court reasoned, did not hold that the defendant's product itself was a
derivative work. Vault, 847 F.2d at 268.
The court also dismissed a related allegation that Quaid contributed to the infringe-
ment of copyright by the RAMKEY users. Although Quaid acknowledged that it had
actual knowledge that its product was used to make unauthorized copies of application
programs, the court reasoned that RAMKEY's use was non-infringing in that it permit-
ted the making of archival copies. Id. According to the court, the Copyright Act "does
not expressly render anyone liable for the infringement committed by another." Id. at
262.
The court's reasoning is troubling. Generally, the law frowns on tools whose sole
purpose is to facilitate taking the property of others. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35
(McKinney 1988) (possession of "any tool, instrument or other article adapted, designed
or commonly used for committing or facilitating offenses involving forcible entry into
premises, or offenses involving larceny by a physical taking" is a misdemeanor). Quaid's
software facilitated the taking of programs. Nevertheless, the Vault court essentially en-
couraged such devices by refusing to enjoin the creation of the next version of the tool.
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2. Modifications for Internal Use
Given that the basic policy behind copyright is economic
protection, a distinction can be made between adaptations cre-
ated for economic gain and adaptations made solely for the
adaptor's use. The CONTU Report suggests that the latter,
when required in order to facilitate the use of a program, is ac-
ceptable.2 " Two recent decisions accept this theory.
In RAV Communications v. Philipp Brothers,26 in which
the Southern District of New York denied a motion of dismissal,
the court ruled that Philipp Brothers, as owner of the object
code produced by RAV, was authorized to make adaptations
under section 117.270 The court held that it was a question of
fact as to whether the adaptations were "more extensive than
section 117 allows. ' 27 1 In its comments, the court argued against
narrowly construing the permitted "essential step" adaptations,
suggesting that the CONTU Report authorized a "broader read-
ing where the owner of a copy of a computer program adapts it
for his own internal use. 2 72
The theory for internal use of adaptations is more fully de-
veloped in Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller.2 s In that
case, the court refused to find infringement in adaptations made
by Pfortmiller to a copy of Foresight's program owned by Hall-
Kimbrell.2 74 Relying on the CONTU Report, the court reasoned
that section 117 "should not be restricted to prohibit owners
from authorizing customer-made enhancements to their copies
of computer programs. ' 27 5 The underlying rationale, and the
268. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 13-14.
269. 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,263, at 21,780 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988).
270. Id. at 21,781-82.
271. Id. at 21,783.
272. Id. at 21,782. The court did not take into account, however, the fact that only
Philipp Brothers' ownership of the object code was undisputed. Ownership of the source
code was undetermined. RAV argued that it "at no time sold, transferred, assigned, or
otherwise conveyed to [Philipp Brothers] any copy of the source code of [the] computer
program." Id. at 21,781. Hence, in disdussing whether the adaptations were permitted
under § 117, the court ignored the fact that Philipp Brothers needed to use the source
code to make their modifications. Philipp Brothers might not have been the owner of
that source code.
273. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
274. Id. at 1009-10.
275. Id. at 1010.
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means by which the court distinguished its case from Micro-
Sparc, Strohon, and Hubco, was that the alterations were not
intended for commercial use.276 Drawing the line at "internal
use," the court struck a balance: the sophisticated user need not
purchase an updated version of the program, and, on the other
hand, the copyright owner's market for the improved version is
not threatened by the user's efforts.2 "
V. Analysis
The purpose of the copyright law is to provide economic
protection for authors.21 8 The purpose of a license is to protect
the program asset.2 79 At issue is whether the copyright law, as
currently interpreted, allows a developer to successfully use a li-
cense to protect his program.
A. A Comparison of Copyright Protection and License
Provisions
1. What is Protectable
In the years since the enactment of the 1980 amendments to
the Copyright Act of 1976,80 the courts have established some
ground rules in the struggle to determine what parts of programs
are, and are not, protectable. Courts seem to have arrived at a
consensus that the medium on which the program is embodied is
not an impediment to protection.2 1 Courts have also generally
agreed that both object and source code are protectable.282 Thus,
the law does not deny to a licensor the right to protect a pro-
gram whether it is distributed in source or in object code form,
regardless of its medium.
On the other hand, the perennial idea/expression problem
remains unresolved. At one end of the spectrum, courts seem
willing to extend protection to any and all aspects of a pro-
276. Id. at 1009.
277. Id. at 1010.
278. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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gram.283 At the other end, courts have refused protection be-
cause the expression is dictated by the underlying idea.284 In the
latter case, licensing a program can ensure a developer's exclu-
sive rights to a program only if it can establish that the program
is a trade secret 2 85
2. Access Issues
To a certain extent, the license provisions restricting access
to the program instructions reflect a recognition by licensors of
the difficulties that idea/expression analysis may present.286 By
distributing their programs in object code and prohibiting disas-
sembly, licensors use the very nature of programs to provide
protection. A licensee can only see the output; the actual in-
structions remain unintelligible.2 8 Absent breach of the license,
another program performing the same function, thus expressing
the same idea, could be created only by independent
development.
In Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller,2 88 the court
questioned the enforceability of provisions for reverse assembly
and decompilation2 89 If such provisions were unenforceable,
then program developers could not prevent their licensees from
analyzing the unique expressions of their programs. In an area
where the idea/expression line is indistinct, this would consider-
ably increase the risk of piracy.
3. Establishing Infringement
As established by court decisions, proof of copying requires
proving both access and substantial similarity.290 Licensing pro-
visions restricting third party access 2 1 do not depend on these
decisions themselves, but on the self-evident rationale behind
them; access to the original work is required to create the in-
283. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 68.
286. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
288. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
289. Id. at 1010.
290. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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fringing work. By prohibiting the licensee from distributing or
even allowing a third party to access a program, the number of
parties with access to the program, potential infringers, is
limited.
4. The Ownership Issue
Together, sections 106 and 117 provide owners with certain
exclusive rights.2 9 2 In GCA Corp. v. Chance,'29 3 Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,2 91 and Micro-Sparc v. Am-
type Corp., 95 the courts limited the rights of the defendants on
the grounds that, while they were possessors who used the pro-
grams, they were not owners. These cases are silent, however, on
the grounds on which they determined ownership status.
In Hubco Data Products v. Management Assistance, Inc.,296
the court was somewhat more forthcoming. In its decision, the
court clearly stated that Hubco was not the owner of the MAI
code.297 While it did not directly state the basis for this opinion,
it did discuss the restrictive MAI licensing agreements.9 8
Under this line of cases, a developer must retain ownership
in order to retain his statutory rights. Since title is transferred
by a sale, the developer cannot sell the program, but must mar-
ket it under a contract or license retaining title. 299 Thus, licens-
ing provisions that retain title establish a basis for a claim of
ownership and allow the developer to restrict the right to copy
and/or create derivative works.300
5. Copying
Under sections 106 and 117, the owner of a program has the
exclusive right to make copies. As CONTU had noted, however,
292. See supra notes 136-37 & 140 and accompanying text.
293. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
294. 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984).
295. 592 F. Supp. 33, 34-35 (D. Mass. 1984).
296. 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983).
297. Id. at 455-56.
298. Id. at 455.
299. See UCC § 2-106 (1987) (" 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979) (a sale
results in a transfer of title).
300. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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using a program requires copying the program from the medium
on which it was distributed into the computer. 0 1 Thus, users
must have the right to copy a program in certain situations for
that program to be marketable. In the court decisions, the dis-
tinction between forbidden and permitted copying often in-
volved a standard based on the copy's commercial use.3 02  The
reasoning was based on the initial purpose of copyright: protect-
ing the economic rights of the owner.303 Copying another's pro-
gram to market it deprives the developer of an opportunity to
market his own program.
License provisions reflect the same reasoning. By retaining
ownership, the licensor has reserved to himself the exclusive
right to create copies of the program. To allow use, the licensor
gives to the licensee limited rights.30 4 Copying for commercial
distribution is prohibited.30 5
6. Derivative Work
Under section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976, the
copyright owner has the exclusive right to "prepare derivative
works" from the copyrighted original.306 CONTU had identified
the logical problem; some adaptation may be necessary in order
to use a program on a computer. 07 Section 117 reserved to the
owner of a copy of a program the right to make adaptations nec-
essary to use the program in a computer. 0 8
In analyzing court decisions, a fundamental distinction that
must be made is whether the derivative work was used internally
by the licensee or whether there was a commercial enterprise de-
veloped around the derivative work.
If the fact pattern of the case falls into the latter category,
301. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 12-13.
302. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1254-55 (3d Cir. 1983) (copying of an Apple operating system to produce Apple compati-
ble personal computers for commercial use infringed Apple's copyright), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
303. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
306. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
307. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 12-13.
308. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (reproduced at notes 138, 140 and accompanying text).
1991]
47
PACE LAW REVIEW
the courts generally protect the economic rights of the original
developer. Thus, for example, Midway,30 9 Hubco,3 10 and S.O.S.31"
protect economic rights of authors against those who created
businesses based on modifications made to another developer's
work. An exception to this rule is carved out in Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd. 1 2 Under the Vault rationale, a fundamen-
tally different purpose saves a work from infringement even
when the work is being commercially marketed.313
On the other hand, if the case deals with a derivative work
which is restricted to internal use, the court will not find an in-
fringement. RAV Communications v. Philipp Brothers314 and
Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller31 ' both stand for the
proposition that adaptations for internal use are allowable since
they cause no economic harm.
Distinguishing between internal and external use can be
more difficult than is initially apparent. For example, in both
RAV and Foresight adaptations were performed by outside con-
sultants. 1 6 The Foresight court enjoined the marketing of a spe-
cific adaptation elsewhere.3 17 Neither it nor RAV considered the
consequences of the consultant performing a similar task for
other customers. Since identifying two programs as similar is ex-
tremely difficult, one can envision situations in which a consult-
ant creates for a business a "new" adaptation which consists of
merely cosmetic changes to an adaptation made for a prior
309. Midway Mfg. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (sale of modifi-
cation kit to owners of Midway's PAC-MAN game).
310. Hubco Data Prod. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D.
Idaho 1983). Hubco focuses particularly on the economic damage caused by the adapta-
tion, viz., the irreparable harm to MAI from the loss of potential customers when Hubco
performs MAI operating system upgrades. Id. at 456-57.
311. S.O.S. v. PAYDAY, 886 F.2d 1081, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1989) (former S.O.S. em-
ployees create a modification of S.O.S.'s program and market it to PAYDAY).
312. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
313. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
314. 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,263 at 21,780, 21,782 (S.D.N.Y. April 13,
1988) (section 117 "should be given a broader reading where the owner of a copy of a
computer program adapts it for his own internal use").
315. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
316. See Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010 and RAV, 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) at
21,781-82.
317. Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010.
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customer. 18
License provisions suggest that developers have come to es-
sentially the same conclusion as the courts; those licenses that
permit the creation of derivative works do so only if those works
are restricted to internal use.3 19 In a related fashion, the provi-
sions restricting access to the program by third parties attempt
to forestall an entrepreneurial consultant. Their effectiveness,
however, is questionable. It can be argued that, in such a role,
the consultant is the agent of the licensee and becomes subject
to the license.
7. License Validity
Underlying any analysis of licensing provisions is the as-
sumption that the license is valid. Without a valid license, title
is not retained by the developer.32 0 Accordingly, the customer is
not a licensee, but an owner, with all of the rights granted to an
owner.
Grounds for arguing the validity of the use of licenses are
found in the CONTU Report where it is suggested that the
rights provided by statute can be varied by agreement between
the parties.32 1
In Vault, however, the court held that the shrink-wrapped
license used was invalid. 22 As a result, the defendant, became
the owner, with all the exclusive rights guaranteed by sections
106 and 117. While not explicitly ruling on license validity, the
Foresight court also questioned the enforceability of the agree-
ment, citing the Vault decision.32 8 Unfortunately, although the
facts suggested a signed agreement, the case is silent on whether
the license at issue was signed or shrink-wrapped.32 4 As a result,
318. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 72-74 & 299 and accompanying text.
321. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 13-14.
322. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988). See
supra note 235 and accompanying text.
323. Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan.
1989).
324. The case explicitly refers to a license. Id. Since Foresight was involved in seem-
ingly large projects involving modifications by written purchase orders, it seems reasona-
ble to assume that the license, like most contracts, was signed.
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the Foresight court may have unwittingly extended the Vault
decision beyond the limits envisioned by the Fifth Circuit.
Whatever the nature of the license, however, the court seemed
to intend to curtail the licensor's rights. It reasoned, in the alter-
native, that even if the agreement was enforceable, "the court
[did] not believe that plaintiffs right to improve or enhance its
products was exclusive. '2 5
These cases present significant problems to a would-be li-
censor. Implicit in the use of a license is the belief of the licensor
that the license under which he distributes his programs is valid.
To the extent a court invalidates a license, or refuses to enforce
some of its provisions, the licensor will not have the protection
he deems necessary and licenses will cease to be a viable method
for program protection.
B. A Re-examination of the CONTU Intent
One standard against which to judge the current status of
the copyright law as applied to programs, is the original intent
of the legislature. Congress' only modification of the CONTU
proposal was the substitution of the term "ownership" for the
term "rightful possessor. ' 's2' The legislative history does not ex-
plain the reason for this change. However, when section 117 is
juxtaposed against section 106 (which it references), it seems
likely that the term "ownership" was used so that the terms in
both sections matched. If this is true, then Congress' purpose
was not to modify CONTU's original intent.
As enunciated in the CONTU Report, it was intended to
give both greater and fewer rights to program users. CONTU
intended greater rights in that it wanted to enable a user with-
out ownership to copy and adapt programs. CONTU intended to
grant fewer rights by restricting such activities to "essential
steps." Considering its goal of protecting the economic rights of
authors, it would seem CONTU was trying to prohibit economic
325. Id. The conclusions on licenses reached by the Kansas district court are incon-
sistent with its supposed reliance on the CONTU REPORT. Although the court quotes
CONTU's statement that program developers could prevent adaptations by contract, it
refuses to enforce such agreements when confronted with them. Id. at 1009.
326. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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exploitation of works, as occurred in Hubco,2 7 Midway,28 and
Vault,,2 9 while permitting those adaptations which did not eco-
nomically affect the program developer, as in RAV 330 and
Foresight.331
The CONTU Report also supports the position that pro-
gram developers could use licenses to protect their programs. 3 2
What neither CONTU, nor anyone else at the time, envisioned
was a need for unsigned agreements.
C. Alternatives to Returning to the CONTU Position
Two alternative methods are available to returning to the
policy established in the CONTU Report. One method would be
to modify section 117,333 replacing "owner" with "rightful pos-
sessor." A clarifying restriction could then be added to the stat-
ute to ensure that the permitted "essential steps" may be per-
formed only for purposes of "internal use." The goal of this
method would be to provide sufficient protection in the statute
and eliminate the need for licenses, unsigned or otherwise.
Another approach is to simply put the onus of protecting
the programs on the industry participants themselves. By en-
forcing the provisions of the licenses, developers would be re-
sponsible for articulating the limits of use. However, if the
Vault 3" and RA V 3 35 line of decisions is continued, this alterna-
tive would require a federal statutes3 6 validating licensing provi-
sions.38 7 Such a statute would be necessary to ensure the validity
327. Hubco Data Prod. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D.
Idaho 1983).
328. Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
329. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
330. RAV Communications v. Philipp Brothers, 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1
26,273, at 21,780 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988).
331. Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
332. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 13-14.
333. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (reproduced at note 138, 140 and accompanying text).
334. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
335. RAV Communications v. Philipp Brothers, 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1
26,273, at 21,780 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988).
336. Only federal actions are viable. Any state sponsored statutes in the copyright
area run the risk of being preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Vault, 847 F.2d at 271.
337. The following is a proposed statute for addressing this problem in the area of
shrink-wrap licenses. It is based on the Louisiana License Act (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1962-64 (West 1987), held preempted by federal copyright law. Vault, 847 F.2d at 271.
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of the developed licenses. 38
The problem with the first proposal is that it does not ad-
dress the problem of an entrepreneur who legitimately licenses a
program, modifies it for "internal use," and then markets his
know-how to other licensees.33 9 According to the CONTU Re-
port, this is one of the situations the statute was designed to
prevent.340
Another concern with the first proposal is that a critical fac-
tor in the formulation of a statute is that it contain a clear defi-
nition of what constitutes "internal use." Given the infinite mu-
tability of the industry, to say nothing of the innovation shown
in infringement, the difficulties involved in clearly articulating
permitted and forbidden uses are significant. This suggests that
relying on Congress' ability to successfully create more precise
language in the copyright statutes might be futile.
Self-help has an advantage in that it places the considerable
burden of finding adequate protection provisions on the market
participants themselves. By allowing many different provisions
to be developed and tested in the market, it would permit an
evolutionary process which would result in an adequate solution.
There is, of course, a genuine risk inherent in authorizing
(A) One who acquires a copy of a program will be deemed to have accepted the terms of
a license agreement by opening the package or using that copy provided that the licens-
ing agreement is affixed prominently to the package or is otherwise clearly communi-
cated to the person acquiring the copy.
(B) If the licensor retains title to copies of the program licensed, the licensor may in-
clude the following provisions in his license:
1) prohibition or limitation of copying the original copy of the program for any purpose
other than backup or archival storage;
2) limitations on the purposes for which copies of the program can be made;
3) limitations on the purposes for which copies of the program can be used or adapted;
4) prohibition or limitation of rights to modify and/or adapt the program in any way,
including, without limitation, prohibitions on viewing, analyzing, translating, reverse en-
gineering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative works based on the
program; and/or
5) prohibition or limitation of the right to distribute copies of the program.
In the event that the license limits copying the program such limitation may not
impair use of the program for business purposes internal to the customer.
338. With this approach, § 117 would remain as currently enacted. The concept of
ownership could be used as the first test in determining control of the adaptation right.
339. This is just a variation of the Hubco strategy. See supra notes 257-61 and ac-
companying text.
340. CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 13.
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such self-help. Giving developers control may result in oppres-
sive licensing provisions which place unreasonable restrictions
on the rights of users. While this risk exists, it is countered by
two forces. First, there is the structure of the marketplace. With
its many competitive entrepreneurs, all jostling for a market
share, a program developer who uses oppressive provisions will
be muscled out of the market by other developers who are will-
ing to take a more reasonable position. In fact, given the compe-
tition, the result is more likely to be the general use of licenses
with no more than minimal protection provisions. Second, artic-
ulate and powerful industry groups exist which counter-balance
the developers interests. These groups have already shown their
ability to protect their rights ridding themselves of unwanted
provisions. 41
On balance, relying on the market forces to shape the re-
quired language seems a more viable approach. If nothing else,
developers and their licensees have an understanding of the
problems involved that Congress lacks.
VI. Conclusion
The purpose of copyright law is to assure economic protec-
tion for authors in order to encourage them to produce their
works for the benefit of society.342 For a program developer, the
need for such protection is not theoretical; program piracy has
reached significant proportions. 43
Licenses are often employed by developers to protect their
assets. Their provisions delineate the areas the developers wish
to protect. In the ten years since the current statute was
amended, a number of cases have been decided which test those
boundaries. Some courts have agreed with developers. Others
are more restrictive. Still others would suggest that such bound-
aries are unenforceable. Industry dissatisfaction and concern
with the results of this evolution is considerable. 44
341. See supra note 69.
342. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., S. Peterson, Ashton-Tate President Calls for Software Law, COM-
PUTER SYsTEM NEWS, May 22, 1989, at 4 (categorizing copyright law as "inadequate",
ADAPSO called for the development of a new law); Lewis, When Computing Power is
Generated by the Lawyers, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990, at F4, col. 2 (industry executives
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It is not surprising that the 1980 statutes are no longer fully
in line with marketplace requirements. They were developed at
a time when the current structure of that market was not fully
formed. 3" Even the experts who formulated these statutes sug-
gested that their work be viewed not as a final product, but as
something that should be continually reviewed and refined.34 6
Therefore, if copyright protection is to continue to be useful in
the programming industry, alternatives must be sought to bring
the law and the marketplace into alignment.
One alternative would be to allow the marketplace itself to
find the acceptable limits of license protection. In the absence of
this, or other such action, the viability of licenses as a means of
protection seems uncertain.
If the existing structure cannot be repaired by the above al-
ternatives or by other proposals, then it seems likely that the
programming industry will be forced to use other, more burden-
some means to protect its assets.34 7 The associated costs may
force many of the smaller players out of the market.
The programming industry has been successful precisely be-
cause of its intensely competitive, entrepreneurial nature. It
would be unfortunate if these characteristics, and the growth
they foster, were to be limited by a failure to address a require-
ment identified a decade ago - the need to continually update
the law to match an ever changing environment.
Lauren Bruzzonet
fear that the results of the court decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International will have a chilling effect on product development).
345. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
346. Noting the kaleidoscopic, if not chaotic, status of computer and software tech-
nology, CONTU recommended in its report that "[a]ny legislation enacted as a result of
these recommendations should be subject to a periodic review to determine its adequacy
in the light of continuing technological change." CONTU REPORT, supra note 128, at 2.
The commission went on to specify that "[tihis review should especially consider the
impact of such legislation on competition and consumer prices in the computer and in-
formation industries and the effect on cultural values of including computer programs
within the ambit of copyright." Id.
347. For example, it could use patents or technological solutions. See supra notes 67
& 69.
t The author would like to thank G. Cone and D. Dye who taught her everything
she knows about writing a program license and quite a bit more.
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